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ABSTRACT
Japan’s Overseas Chinese Policies
in Southern Vietnam during World War II
by
CHOI Siu Tsun
Master of Philosophy

“Overseas Chinese is the mother of the Chinese revolution.” This quotation
reflects the conventional perception that overseas Chinese is the chief enemy of Japan.
However, this is in contrast with Vietnam’s overseas Chinese view; Japan considered
them as a potential and crucial ally in Japan's Expansion in Southeast Asia. Chinese’s
economic dominance in Vietnam, especially its monopoly in the rice industry and its
traditional commercial network, provided them with an incredible political influence
and bargaining power. This thesis aimed to rediscover the historical truth of overseas
Chinese in Southern Vietnam during wartime by studying the transitions and policies
made by Japan on overseas Chinese on French Indochina.
It is commonly viewed that overseas Chinese are nationalist and have strong
emotional attachment towards the motherland, China. However, there seem to have
decline on their nationalism and their main concern was on bloodline, local community,
survival and economic interest. The loss of Canton clique from the power struggle with
Kuomintang strengthened the regional identity of Cantonese. It also created hostility
towards the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek. The transition of attitude
and selection to cooperate with Japan in the wartime was deemed a significant topic of
Chinese politics and geopolitics in Southeast Asia in the 1930s.
The overseas Chinese work of Nanking Nationalist government was successful
in French Indochina. However, that was the only successful case of overseas Chinese
work in Southeast Asia. The establishment and implementation of Japan’s policies on
overseas Chinese in French Indochina differ from overseas Chinese in other occupied
regions in Southeast Asia. This unique treatment reflected how Japan viewed the
importance of overseas Chinese in French Indochina for its Pacific War’s scheme. Rice
resource and geographical significance of French Indochina forced Japan to put special
consideration and measures on French Indochina. Overseas Chinese's economic
dominance in French Indochina, especially the rice industry made them primary target
for Japan to win.
To recover the historical truth hidden behind the ‘myth’ and propaganda of
overseas Chinese, this research utilized the historical sources from different sides of
interest, including army report, newspaper, books, and articles on time. Japan
government’s official records dating back from the 1920s to the 40s could shed light to
the perception and reality of Japan’s policies on overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia
and French Indochina. With the opening of the confidential documents of the Japanese
Military, it is possible to reshape the historical role of overseas Chinese in Vietnam and

eliminate the perceptions created by different political parties. To date, overseas
Chinese is still influential in Vietnam and its neighboring countries.
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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TOPIC
There are limited studies and sources on overseas Chinese in French Indochina.
With the newly publicized sources and materials available online, there has been a
renewed interest on the topic relating to Japan and China’s history. Through the latest
research findings and technologies, this thesis is informed by the latest and oldest
research from Japan, China, Taiwan and the West. This paper tried to recover the
historical truth by comparing the various of historical sources and research. By
evaluating differing perspectives, it aimed to eliminate possible perceptions leaning
toward political ideologies. There had been so much vague conception on overseas
Chinese. Studying their history in French Indochina/ Vietnam would hopefully unveil
the image of overseas Chinese, and the role they played in history. Advancement in
society made it is possible to access to differing perspectives and ideologies, not being
limited by one’s geographic location and nationality. This paper aimed to synthesize
the studies reviewed and propose another view on overseas Chinese.

Japan's primary purpose in its expansion in Southeast Asia during World War
II was to seize French Indochina. At that time, Japan, which was trapped in the longterm Sino-Japanese War, attempted to prevent allied weapons and ammunition and
military supplies from the French Indochina to the Chongqing National Government.
As a result of the negotiations of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Governor of the French Indochina allowed Japan to dispatch a surveillance team and
was also recognized by the French government’s ambassador. Therefore, Japan
dispatched a surveillance team to the French Indochina. On June 29, 1940, the
Japanese surveillance team entered the territory of the Indochina branch of France and
was dispersed in five "national surveillance stations." Therefore, the Japanese
government was able to completely block the "helping Chiang Kai-shek path" in the
French Indochina. After that, on September 23, 1940, the Japanese army carried out
the northern French Indochina intrusion on September 23, 1940, and intrusion the
southern French Indochina in 1941.
After the invasion of Japanese troops on French Indochina, policies on military
governance were not strictly implemented, unlike the other Southeast Asian countries.
Instead, it preserved the existing French colonial regime and adopted the policy of "cocontrolling" French Indochina with France. This political system, known as the
Japanese-French Common Dominance System, was maintained until March 9, 1945,
1

when the Japanese military decided to force the handling of the French Indochina
problem and launch the coup d'état1 in French Indochina.
However, the purpose of Japan's intrusion into French Indochina was not only
to block the military support route of the Chongqing National Government, but also to
gain defense resources and food supplies. After the end of 1939, the Japanese
government decided to form an "empire economic self-sufficiency circle" in the South
to get rid of dependence on the Anglo-American economy. By the 1940s, the United
States’ export restrictions on Japan had gradually strengthened, and it was difficult to
obtain supplies from the United States. As the relationship deteriorated, the possibility
of war between the United Kingdom and the United States continued to increase. Also,
before the start of the Pacific War, Japan lacked a source of food supply, and relied
heavily on Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan. As a result, the food supply of China, Korea,
and Taiwan has become a big problem that can shake Japan's food supply. Just like the
natural disasters that occurred in North Korea and Taiwan in 1939, it exerted great
pressure on Japan's domestic food supply.23 Katayanagi even pointed out that, “the
French Indochina is the granary for the entire Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”4
To address the insufficient supply of domestic food, Japan has paid
considerable attention to the supply of rice in the world's three rice producing regions:
Myanmar, French Indochina and Thailand. Japan has focused on French Indochina,
not only because it is an essential source of food supply, but also it is geographically
adjacent to China, and also part of Southeast Asia. Its location is ideal to Japan’s plan
of expanding its influence in the future. To this end, Japan implemented a large-scale
rice policy in French Indochina during and after they invaded French Indochina.
Japan’s rice policy is considered to be one of the reasons for the great famine in
northern Vietnam in 1945.5
At that time, the economy of French Indochina is heavily influenced by
overseas Chinese. They have the monopoly of rice-polishing industry and the rice-

1

Meigo Sakusen 明号作戦
Shiraishi Masaya 白石昌也, Japan’s Economic Policy towards Indochina in the Second World War
第二次大戦期の日本の対インドシナ経済政策, Southeast Asian History Society, “Southeast Asia:
History and culture” 15, 1986.
3
Katayanagi Shinkichi 片柳眞吉, Japan Wartime Food Policy 日本戦時食糧政策, Ito Bookstore,
1942.
4
Katayanagi , Japan Wartime Food Policy, 251. (quoted from Iwanami Course: Asiatic Pacific War
(7) Domination and violence 岩波講座 アジア・太平洋戦争〈7〉支配と暴力, Iwanami Shoten).
5
Kurazawa Aiko 倉沢愛子, “Logistics System in the Empire 帝国內の物流”, Domination and
Violence (Iwanami Courses in Pacific War), Iwanami Publishers, 2006, 148-149.
2
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paddy distribution and trade, even though their population does not exceed 2% of the
total population of the French Indochina. Therefore, if Japan wants to dominate French
Indochina for economic and military reasons, it must not only obtain the cooperation
of the French Indochina authorities but also the support of overseas Chinese in the area.
The overseas Chinese in French Indochina is the key to Japan’s problem.

3

LITERATURE REVIEW
Japan’s Policy in French Indochina
Politics, Diplomatic Aspects
The intrusion of Japanese troops in French Indochina had long been one of the
foci within the studies of the French Indochina during the Second World War.6 The
various materials of Japan’s army, navy, and diplomatic authorities, and the political
and military motives of Japan's intrusion in French Indochina, for example, to stop
European countries and the United States from supplying military supplies to the
Chongqing government, which was to cut off the supply route of Chiang Kai-shek
(Chiang's Aid Route Ǹ26(). To find out the truth, many pieces of researches
have been concentrated on the policy decisions and implementation process of the
intrusion of Japanese troops in French Indochina.
These studies have argued the following:
1. The purpose of Japan’s French Indochina is to resolve the long-term Sino-Japanese
war quickly and to cut off the Chongqing National Government’s cooperation with
the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and other allies, that is, the cut-off of
the "Chiang’s supply line."
2. In the historical materials related to the Army, the Navy, and the Cabinet, to
explore the opposition and power struggles between the Army, the Navy, the
Ministry of Military Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the process of
deciding of the intrusion of Japanese troops in northern French Indochina.
3. The intrusion of Japanese troops in French Indochina was the first step in the
specification of the "Southward policy," and to discuss its position in the expansion
of the war.
In these studies, it can be seen that in Japan’s overseas Chinese policy, the guiding
institutes struggle and oppose to each other, while the policies were incoherence.
Notably, the army and the navy against each other for the guidance and the leadership
of the war, are the main reasons for the out-of-control of the war. It was also the main
reason led to Japan's intrusion into French Indochina.

In the Western academia, there was high level of attention to the Japanese
army's dynamics from the intrusion of Japanese troops in French Indochina to the
Japanese coup d'état in French Indochina. Sachiko Murakami’s focus is on the
6

Motoo Furuta, "Current Research Trends in Japan", Indochina, Thailand, Japan and France during
World WarII: Overview of Existing Literature and Related Documents for the Future Development of
Research, Waseda University Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (WIAPS), 2015, 24.
4

comparing of the US diplomatic and military materials, the relevant historical
materials of the French colonies, and the materials from the Japanese Defense Agency,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Governor's Office of Taiwan with each other,
to study the details of the political and diplomatic aspects of the Japan-French
Indochina cooperation, its relation with the national independence movement of
Vietnam. 7 The period from 1940 to 1945 was seen as the pre-history of the first
Vietnam War in the Western academic field. Therefore, on the political and diplomatic
aspects, it was pointed out that the Japanese coup d'état in French Indochina as an
essential factor behind the national independence movement of Vietnam. However, at
the time of research on the French Indochina, it is crucial to analyze Japanese action.
However, most of the European and American studies were not capable to utilize the
first-hand historical materials on Japan’s side. Instead, most of them have used the
French historical materials, which have not been comprehensive in their research
therefore. Still, The Penguin History of Modern Vietnam, Linking Books of
Christopher Goscha, provided an obvious structure for the framework of this thesis.8
Although it did not mention many details about Japan’s exact plan, policy, or overseas
Chinese work in Vietnam, since it was focus in the general history of modern Vietnam,
in it the period of Joint-domination was not the critical partk, still, it provides the clear
explanations of some fundamental concepts related to overseas Chinese in Vietnam,
such as the significance of overseas Chinese commercial network to the colonial
governance, the origin of the congregation system, the situation that overseas Chinese
occupied the rice market and the importance of rice exportation of French Indochina
to the world market.

In the Chinese academic field, the mainstream of the studies and research on
Vietnam and French Indochina were focused on the transition of overseas Chinese
society in Vietnam (French Indochina) after WWII, and their escape from Communist
Vietnam. Moreover, some of them focused on overseas Chinese society under French
colonial rule. Owing to the limitation of the source from the Chinese side, the Chinese
scholars tended to rely on oral history and memorials of the overseas Chinese to
reconstruct the wartime history. Various of memorials based on the memories of the

7

Sachiko Murakami 村上さち子, Japan’s Thrust into French Indochina 1940‒1945, Ph.D. thesis,
New York University, 1981.
8
Christopher Goscha, Tan Tian (trans), The Penguin History of Modern Vietnam (Taipei, Linking
Books), April 2018.
5

survivals were published with using some of the Japanese materials as evidences.
However, most of the Chinese books and articles about the overseas Chinese in
Vietnam (French Indochina) were focused on the pre-war and postwar events, only
very few of them had analyzed Japanese overseas Chinese policy or the Joint
governing of Japan and France in French Indochina during the war. In French
Indochina, as the Chinese newspapers were banned soon after Japan’s intrusion, the
last record of Chinese news report about the overseas Chinese in Vietnam and French
Indochina was in 1941. After that, in 1942-1943, pro-Japanese journals and articles
published successively. Most of the pro-Japanese publications were published in
Shanghai, under the administration of the Nanjing National Government, the puppet
regime of Japan leaded by Wang Jingwei. However, before Japanese invasion in
French Indochina, journalist such as Ban Sheng %9 and Bai Yang(

10

left the

observation of the overseas Chinese societies in French Indochina from the 1910s to
the 1930s. Tang Wen Rui m¢11, stated the domination of overseas Chinese in the
French Indochina rice market, emphased the significance of overseas Chinese in the
local economy. Also, Zhang Kwaifu >12 and Nanyang Information[b

 in

193313, had noted the crisis of Japanese invasion and reported the various kinds of
anti-Japanese movement in economic, political and social aspects that overseas
Chinese in French Indochina organized to save their motherland. After 1941, the proJapan Chinese news reports about Vietnam (French Indochina) appeared, and the
reports and translation of Japanese articles or research on the overseas Chinese’s antiJapanese resistance in French Indochina. Among the pro-Japanese propaganda and
news, a special case is Kang Chuan ’s translation of Shoichi Matsuda Q'’s
“Trend of Overseas Chinese in Vietnam: The Anti-Japanese force is still Strong”, but
it replaced the name of “Zeng Zhongmin” by “Zeng Traitor Zhongmin”, and called the
Wang regime as “Wang fake regime”, which was a strong claim of the political
statement of the translator, while it attempted to turn the Japanese propaganda into
9

Ban Sheng 半生, “The Business of Overseas Chinese in Indochina 印度支那華僑之經營”, New
China 新中華, 1915.
10
Bai Yang 白楊, “Overseas Chinese in Vietnam 越南華僑現狀”, New Live 新生, 1934, vol.1, no.3,
47-49.
11
Tang Wen Rui 唐文瑞, “Overseas Chinese Rice Merchants in Vietnam 越南華僑米商之現狀”,
Economic Monthly 經濟學月刊, 1934, vol.1, no.3, 1-10.
12
Zhang Kwaifu 張快夫, “Japanese Invasion of Vietnam and the Crisis of Overseas Chinese 日人侵
略越南與華僑之危機”, Nanyang Information 南洋情報, 1933, vol.2, no.4.
13
Anonymous,“Nation-saving Fundraising by Overseas Chinese in Vietnam 越南華僑募款救國”,
Nanyang Information 南洋情報, 1933, vol.1, no.6, 236.
6

theirs.14 Moreover, it showed that during the Sino-Japanese War, in mainland China,
there still a certain level of concern on the situation of French Indochina, and probably
wanted to encourage the Chinese people by the resistance of overseas Chinese in
Vietnam. Most of the Chinese source were not reflecting the Japanese overseas
Chinese policy in French Indochina. However, it did provide solid background
information with the record of how overseas Chinese respond to the Japanese Invasion
in China and Vietnam from the Sino-Japanese War to the beginning of Japan’s
invasion in French Indochina.
After the French Indochina was stationed, Japan launched a unique policy in
the Indochina. In the study of Shiraishi Masaya and Furuta Motoo, which focused on
the particularities of these policies, they analyzed and pointed out two characteristics
of Japan’s policy toward Indochina.
1. In September 1940, after the northern French Indochina was stationed by the
Japanese troops, and in the four and a half years to March 9, 1945, Japan
retained the colonial regime in French Indochina.
2. After the Japanese coup d'état in French Indochina on March 9, 1945, Japan
giving independence to the 3 Indochinese countries, and the pro-Japanese
regimes were established and supported by Japan, which was different from
Japan’s military administration in other regions of Southeast Asia.
The purpose of these policies is to use the old colonial governance institutions
to avoid instability and to ensure Japan’s domination in French Indochina. It is a
"reasonable" way to obtain the necessary resources efficiently. 15

Economic Aspect
According to the existing researches, Japan’s troops invaded and occupied
French Indochina, motivated by the ideal to solve the long-term Sino-Japanese war, to
break the ABCD encirclement, (A: America; B: Britain; C: China; D:
Netherlands(Dutch)).16 On the other hand, to the Franco-Japanese relationship during

14

Kang Chuan 康川(Trans.), Shoichi Matsuda 松田莊一, “Trend of Overseas Chinese in Vietnam:
The Anti-Japanese force is still Strong” 越南華僑的動向 —抗日勢力仍屬強靭—, Modern Overseas
Chinese 現代華僑, 1942, vol.3, no.7, 12-16.
15
Masaya Shiraishi, Motoo Furuta, “Japanese Wartime Policy toward Indochina,” Aziya Kenkyu
(Asian Studies), Vol. 23, No.3, Oct. 1976.
16
Inoue Mitsusada 井上光貞, Nagahara Keiji 永原慶二, Kodama Kota 児玉幸多, and Okubo
Toshiaki 大久保利謙, eds., Series of Japanese History (17) Era of Reform and War (Tokyo
Yamagawa Press), 1997, 224.
7

the Japanese-French Co-ordination Period, Tabuchi Yukichika '  K ¹ and
Shiraishi Masaya ()O , the influential studies in the field pointed out that, other
than the military aspect, the economic incentives and economic importance played the
significant roles in the establishment of the Japan-France Joint-domination system in
French Indochina. However, up to now, there has only been little researches studies
from the angle of economic aspect in this period.1718
Focused on the economic expectations of Japan towards French Indochina
during the Second World War, Tabuchi’s researches in the 1980s emphases the
“granary” role of French Indochina in Japan’s grand plan. 1920 By focusing on the
detailed reports and records of the "French Indochina Resource Survey," which was
dispatched to the French Indochina in 1941, with the focus of the current rice
distribution agency, Tabuchi tried to understand Japan’s intention of intrusion in
French Indochina.21 From the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War until the outbreak of
the Pacific War, Japan had made considerable researches and investigations on the
customs, resources, economy, and local colonial rule policies of Southeast Asia
including Indochina. Through the information collected from these studies and
investigations, Japan has obtained information that will help its expansion in the region
during the war. And among different regions in Southeast Asia, Japan was particularly
concerned about Indochina. According to Tabuchi's research, this is due to Japan’s
lack of food self-sufficiency and the fragility of its food supply system, which let
ensuring food supply became the most urgent task for Japan. It motivated Japan’s
invasion on French Indochina.22 At the same time, Tabuchi’s study also explored the
export of rice in the French Indochina to Japan from the First World War to 1945,
includes the rice trading system in French Indochina, and Japan’s rice collecting policy
in Vietnam. It pointed out that Japan was necessary to compete (and to fully utilize,

17

Tabuchi Yukichika 田渕幸親. An Overview of the Indochinese Study under Japanese rule 日本支
配下のインドシナ研究概史, Nagasaki International University Review, volume 4, 2004.1, 57.
18
Motoo Furuta, "Current Research Trends in Japan", Indochina, Thailand, Japan and France during
World WarII: Overview of Existing Literature and Related Documents for the Future Development of
Research, Waseda University Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (WIAPS), 2015, 11-29.
19
Motoo Furuta, "Current Research Trends in Japan", 15.
20
It also in Katayanagi Shinkichi (片柳眞吉), Japan Wartime Food Policy (日本戦時食糧政策), Ito
Bookstore, 1942.
21
Yukichika Tabuchi, “Japan’s Colonial Policy in French Indochina 1940‒41(日本の対イント㿆シ
ナ『植民地』化フ㿇ランとその実態),” Southeast Asia: History and Culture, No. 9, Feb. 1980.
22
Yukichiya Tabuchi, “Indochina’s Role in Japan’s “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere(『大東
亜共栄圏』とイント㿆シナ―食糧獲得のための戦略―),” Southeast Asia: History and Culture,
No. 10, Jun 1981.
8

gradually) with the overseas Chinese capital in Indochina at that time. So, as to rapidly
get access to the rice in Indochina, it was essential for Japan to maintain the existing
colonial system and the colonial government of French.232425
In the process of Japanese-French economic negotiations, Shiraishi pointed out
that the motive of Japan’s intervention (invasion) on French Indochina on the
economic side is to ensure the food supply. 26 Paul Kratoska's paper collection
discussed Japan’s policy of securing its food supply in South-East Asian countries with
its military power, from the perspectives of transportation, agriculture, and trade.27 In
the study of Vietnamese, there are studies by Nguyen The Anh and Furuta Motoo.
Nguyen used the 1945 famine as a starting point to link Japan's food policy with the
famine in northern Vietnam. Furuta based on the field study conducted in Vietnam
tries to recover the actual situation in rural Vietnam during the 1945 famine.28

Japan’s Overseas Chinese Policy and the trend of the overseas Chinese in
Southeast Asia during Wartime
Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia had always been noticed and was one of
the major attention of the academic field, which have a certain amount of existing
research already. The focus of this thesis is the anti-Japanese movement of overseas
Chinese in Southeast Asia, Japan's policy toward overseas Chinese and the role of the
French Indochina overseas Chinese. The relevant research will be summarized below.
Until now, there have been many previous studies on overseas Chinese in
wartime. The subjects of these studies are mainly divided into five categories.
1. Anti-Japanese activities of the overseas Chinese, starting from Southeast
Asia
2. Overseas Chinese under the Japanese occupation of the colonies and
occupied territories
23

Shiraishi, T., & Furuta, M. (1992). Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s. Cornell Univ Southeast Asia.
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3. The relationship between the Chongqing National Government and the
Nanjing National Government and overseas Chinese
4. Wartime Overseas Chinese Network
5. Japan's overseas Chinese policy
Among the studies, many of them were based on the overseas Chinese
contribution in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (Sino-Japanese
War), while the focus those researches are on the anti-Japanese movement of overseas
Chinese in the world, or the material and labor support of overseas Chinese for their
home country.

One of the representative figures in the study of the anti-Japanese movement
of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia is Akashi Yoji. Akashi studied the overseas
Chinese anti-Japanese movement in Southeast Asia and its actual situation from the
Sino-Japanese War to the Pacific War, as well as the overseas Chinese anti-Japanese
movements in Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Indochina and
other countries. Akashi's research pointed out that the Southeast Asian overseas
Chinese who faced the crisis of China's survival launched the anti-Japanese national
salvation activities and the boycotting of the Japanese goods movement, and formed
the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Association [b¨¼, successfully integrated
the overseas Chinese forces in the region. Along with the progress of the anti-Japanese
movement, the Kuomintang's boycott of Japanese goods movement has gradually
contradicted the economic considerations of overseas Chinese. At the same time,
Akashi pointed out that in the competition between the Chiang Kai-shek regime and
the Wang Jingwei regime, the Nanyang overseas Chinese and their anti-Japanese
activities, the overseas Chinese have different participation in the Japanese movement
because of different origins. For example, within the anti-Japanese movement, the
overseas Chinese who came from Guangdong had inconsistent actions with the
overseas Chinese who came from Fujian. Also, to ensure economic benefits, some
overseas Chinese choose to cooperate with the local government, and their attitude
towards Japan is unclear. Some overseas Chinese have maintained a neutral position
even during the activities and sports of the entire Nanyang Overseas Chinese
Association.
Ichikawa Kenjiro covered the anti-Japanese movements of overseas Chinese
in Southeast Asia after the start of the Sino-Japanese War, for example, in British
10

Malaya, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, as well as the relative pro-Japanese
movements as case studies, emphasizing the overseas Chinese was active in the antiJapanese movement based on material support during the war.29

The long-standing view emphasizes the participation of overseas Chinese in
the anti-Japanese movement and has made tremendous contributions to their
motherland. In contrast, recent studies have gradually pointed out the other side of the
cooperation between overseas Chinese society and Japan. Based on the economic data
of the Japanese side, the structure and dynamics of the overseas Chinese network in
Southeast Asia were observed in Kagotani Naoto’s research. The fact that the overseas
Chinese were "open" to the Japanese trade during the Sino-Japanese War gradually
became clear.30 Also, the political action on the Japanese side is also one of the focuses.
In Matsuura Masataka’s study, after the "Greater East Asia War" began, Japan used
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, Japan, and Taiwan, and achieved cooperation as
part of the overseas Chinese. 31 Kikuchi Kazutaka also pointed out that overseas
Chinese sent to Wang Jingwei and Japan, or may be related to the "hostage" of the
family of overseas Chinese in Fujian, Guangdong, and the Japanese occupation.
According to War and Overseas Chinese: The Political Dynamics between Japan,
Chinese Government Office, Puppet Regime and Overseas Chinese, under the
domination of Japan, supporting China’s war of resistance has become impossible for
overseas Chinese to "live, protect their property and return to China, or remain silent,
or cooperate with Japan, no matter which option, both are neutral positions.32 These
studies point to another aspect of the cooperation between overseas Chinese and
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, which is different from the overseas Chinese
patriotism and anti-Japanese activities emphasized by the Institute.
The research in China and Taiwan is mainly based on the two theories of "the
overseas Chinese are the mother of the revolution" and "the patriotism of overseas
Chinese." By using a large amount of historical data of the Kuomintang, the
29
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Communist Party, and the Wang Jingwei regime, and analyzing in detail the overseas
Chinese work, overseas Chinese affairs, and the trends of overseas Chinese of the
Chongqing National Government and the Nanjing National Government. The research
so far has emphasized the good relations between China and overseas Chinese, the
contribution to overseas Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War, and the patriotism of
overseas Chinese. However, after the 1990s, especially in Taiwan, the overseas
Chinese in the war made many opinions that were different from the previous studies.
Gu Hongyan's "The Problem of Identity of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia:
Malaya,” pointed out the ignorance of economic factors in the general study,
neglecting the economic relationship between Japan and overseas Chinese in French
Indochina, and the cause of affecting the attitude of overseas Chinese.33
Shiu Wentang used the Kuomintang materials to study the Vietnamese
overseas Chinese society from World War II to the first Indochina war. On top of this,
he explored the impact of war on the Vietnam overseas Chinese on the material level.
His research pointed out that during the occupation of Southeast Asia by the Japanese
army, some of the overseas Chinese in Vietnam, especially those from Guangdong and
Fujian provinces, protect own lives were their priority, and in order to obtain or
maintain economic benefits, they choose to support the Nanjing National Government
and their attitude towards Japan have gradually changed.34
In Lee Ying-Hui’s book, Anti-Japan and Attach-Japan: Overseas Chinese,
Nationalist Government, and the Wang Regime, she divided the overseas Chinese into
the factions of “anti-Japanese” and “attached-Japanese,” pointing out that the antiJapanese overseas Chinese are mostly “Sinkeh 35 ” and attached-Japanese overseas
Chinese are mostly local-born overseas Chinese. The book also discusses that the antiJapanese overseas Chinese and the attached Japanese overseas Chinese made different
choices due to their different political, economic, military, and geographical conditions
and base.36
The overseas Chinese work of the Chongqing National Government and the
Nanjing National Government, as well as their struggle for overseas Chinese, is also
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an important research direction. In the study of Yasui Sanji, the concern to the overseas
Chinese within the Japanese empire, from the Peking Provisional Government, the
Nanjing Restoration Government, and finally the Wang Jingwei regime, all showed a
kind of "from the enemy nationals" to the "nationals of the friends." Overseas
Chinese's "sugar and whip" policy. In the Japanese side of the information, more
emphasis on such management aspects of the description.37
To understand the trends of overseas Chinese, Huang Xiaojian's research not
only analyzes overseas Chinese from the perspective of inherent nationalism, but also
through the structure of overseas Chinese population, the political status of overseas
Chinese, academic qualifications and social status. However, Huang Xiaojian’s
research is still limited by the Chinese-centered thinking model, thus failing to have
more discussion on the roles of the influential overseas Chinese, the trend of overseas
Chinese, and the competition between the Chongqing National Government and the
Nanjing National Government on overseas Chinese work.38
Still, the study of Japan's overseas Chinese policies in Southeast Asia is
minorities in Japan. The existing researches have analyzed the actual state of overseas
Chinese policies carried out by Japan in British Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines and
South China. Yoji Akashi, Ikehata, and Higuchi are some of the examples. Ikehata
focused on the Philippine overseas Chinese society under the Japanese military
governance in his research, and from Japan's suppression policy over the overseas
Chinese there, discussed the overseas Chinese's anti-Japanese activities under Japan's
military governance.39 In the study of Higuchi, it examines the actual situation of the
overseas Chinese work carried out by the Japanese Navy in the early days of the SinoJapanese War. According to the investigation of Higuchi, for overseas Chinese, "proJapanese" and "pro-Wang" have far differences. It pointed out that overseas Chinese
cooperated with the pro-Japanese Wang regime, by having the purpose of using proJapanese political power for China's construction, without cooperating with Japan
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directly as the “traitors.”40
In the papers collection compiled by Akashi Yoji, the focus is on the reality of
Japan's occupation in Southeast Asia, its significance and limitations, and the issues
of economic policy under the Japanese military and political affairs, policies toward
the Communist, and the elimination of overseas Chinese. Among them, it also includes
Akashi's analysis of the process and content of the "Nanyang Overseas Chinese Work
Program" that made by Japan's 25th Army.41
The above is the sorting out of various studies on the overseas Chinese in
Southeast Asia and Japan's overseas Chinese policy in the wartime. Most of the above
studies focused on overseas Chinese society, explored the relationship between
overseas Chinese, Chongqing National Government and Nanjing National
Government from multi-angle perspectives. They also discussed the impact of Japan's
overseas Chinese policy on the movement of overseas Chinese. The predecessors
mentioned above' research and the discussion of Japan's policy toward the overseas
Chinese in French Indochina, as well as the movements of overseas Chinese in the
area, were usually fragmentary. However, due to the restrictions of sources and
materials, it can hardly describe the realities of the overseas Chinese society during
the era of Japan-France Joint Domination, and it is often unattached to the discussion
of Japan’s overseas Chinese policy in French Indochina.

Research purposes
After a brief discussion of the predecessor's researches above, this thesis would
like to explain the following 2 points:
1. The relationship between Japan's French Indochina policy, the formulation of
the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Policy, and the French Indochina policy.
2. In parallel with it, the French Indochina overseas Chinese responded to the
Japanese overseas Chinese policy.
One of the thesis's themes was when it was Japan, the French Indochina regime,
and the Chinese overseas in French Indochina; the three sides gradually formed a
cooperative relationship in doubt because of their interests.
40
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Methodology
This thesis mainly discusses the Chinese overseas policy of Japan in the French
Indochina during World War II. Unfortunately, because of the long-term wars, most
of the historical sources in Vietnam were burnt fire in the field, or at the end of the
war. From here, the source is rare, and the restrictions are extensive. The focus of the
period of investigation was in 1942 when the Japanese army entered the northern
French Indochina in 1940 and began its war in the Pacific War. However, to respond
to this, it must be taken from the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s and
the end of the war in 1945. Therefore, although this paper is based on the title of 1940
to 1945, its discussion is far beyond from this. The French Indochina's jurisdiction, is
today's Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. However, at that time, Vietnam was the center
of Indochina, and it was the most comprehensive of the three countries and the most
prominent. Moreover, most of the overseas Chinese of French Indochina lived in
Vietnam today due to historical factors. Therefore, the object of this article will also
be based on Vietnamese overseas Chinese.
Starting from the ancient times, there were different names for the Chinese who
lived overseas. The traditional “Tang people m ,” “Han people ¬

,” “northerners”

of Vietnam, and also “Chinese workers Huagong ” in the modern times. In the
1870s and 1980s, for the needs of signing the treaties, the Qing court defined the
Chinese merchants abroad at the time with the idiom of "Qiao Ju Hua Min ¨J$."
"Hua Min" means “Chinese people” and "Qiao Ju" means “residence overseas.” 42
Therefore, “overseas Chinese” was not a new concept but was a new word.
In Vietnam, Chinese immigrants there had various names, such as "Overseas
Chinese (Huaqiao)," "Chinese (Huaren 

)" and "Chinese Blood (Huayi ¥)." To

make a serious distinction, the so-called "Overseas Chinese (Huaqiao)," were Chinese
living abroad with Chinese nationality, the so-called "Chinese (Huaren)," is the
Chinese who have lived overseas and obtained local nationality. The so-called
"Chinese Blood (Huayi)" are the descendants of the above two overseas Chinese.
However, during the Pacific War, in Indochina (Vietnam), there was no strict
distinction between these three terms. They are altogether considered as "Chinese 
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" at the time. Described by Hamashita Takeshi, Overseas Chinese is a

combination of nationality (Chinese nation identity), locality, politics, and economy.43
This thesis uniformly referred "Overseas Chinese" all the Chinese immigrants in
Vietnam for the convenience of readers.
The next was the sources and materials that used in the thesis. Up to now, the
research of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia used the historical sources mostly
related to the Chinese Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. By the needs of
analysis, the trend of the overseas Chinese, it is necessary to make use of the historical
materials of the Chinese side, other from the Japanese side. However, since this thesis
does not only focus on the overseas Chinese society in French Indochina but also
focuses on the Japanese overseas Chinese policy there, to mainly focus on the
historical materials of the Japanese side would be inevitable. Thence, this paper has
applied the first-hand materials on the side of policymakers from the governmental
institutes of Japan, such as the Defense Institute, and the National Public Libraries in
Japan. This paper also made use of Japan's overseas Chinese investigation and research
reports in the 1930s, which depicts the concepts and understandings of Japan toward
the overseas Chinese before and during the war, with the reason behind.
On the other hand, this paper also actively uses the Japanese news and other
information that may be ignored in the past. The strict regulations on reporting news
had restricted the news during the wartime and turned the news to propaganda to raise
the morale during wartime. However, from the new articles, it is still possible to
observe Japanese understanding of the French Indochina overseas Chinese and the
situation of the French Indochina overseas Chinese, with their interactions and
responses. However, since the Japanese government and the Japanese army burned a
significant amount of information at the end of the war, a considerable number of
related documents and records were burned.

The Composition of the Thesis
The purpose of this thesis is the reality of Japan’s policy toward the overseas
Chinese in French Indochina during the Second World War. Japan’s formulation and
implementation of the Chinese overseas policy and the response of overseas Chinese
43
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are the key points.
Chapter 1 overviewed French Indochina overseas Chinese society before the
intrusion of Japanese troops. It clarified the characteristics of the Chinese overseas
society of the French Indochina and the policy of French Indochina regime.
Chapter 2 described the trend of the French Indochina overseas Chinese in the
early period of the Sino-Japanese War, with a discussion on their anti-Japanese
movements.
Chapter 3 discussed how the Japanese government and military planned to strive
for overseas Chinese support, for solving the Sino-Japanese war and to build the Great
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Also, it discussed the transition of Japan’s overseas
Chinese policy according to the changing situation. From the transition of Japan's
overseas Chinese policy, the significance of overseas Chinese to Japan would be more
precise.
Chapter 4 discussed the implementation of Japan’s first practice of overseas
Chinese policies in Southeast Asia after it is an intrusion into French Indochina. How
Japan carried out its overseas Chinese policy in French Indochina under the Jointdomination system of Japan and France would be discussed and analyzed.
Chapters 5 and 6 tried to recover the reality of Japan’s policy and overseas Chinese
work in French Indochina, how the overseas Chinese there responded, and the
transition of the overseas Chinese’s trend there.

The Limitation of the Thesis
Due to the language barrier, this thesis did not directly use the source and
materials in French. However, many of the researches from Japan, Vietnam, and the
United States on the related topics had quoted and used the sources in French, such as
the official record of the French Indochina government, the records of the Cochinchina police and the surveys that done by the colonial government. The reports of
Japanese government/ institutes on Indochina, or French Indochina overseas Chinese,
also take reference of various French sources. So, this thesis, however, still covered
the French perspectives on a certain level.
Moreover, in the usage of sources in Chinese. There were various materials
about the topic in Chinese, which mainly divided into few types, which are: (1) News
and magazines, (2) translation of the studies (mostly in Japan), (3) researches and
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studies after the war. Among them, not much Chinese primary source could provide a
whole picture on the issue, may be due to the problem of material preservation.
Moreover, the researches and studies after the war were mainly focused on the
massacre and harsh treatment on overseas Chinese of Japan, in which Japan’s
policymaking or implementation of overseas Chinese work was not the focus. The
researches of Lee Ying-Hui in recent years is one of the leader scholars who studied
the overseas Chinese theme in the field. However, other than Li, not much-qualified
origin researches have been done, which led to the usage of Chinese research on the
topic, therefore limited. The primary source in Chinese was quoted frequently in this
thesis. However, most of them were a translation from the Japanese report and studies.
Still, from some of the translations, it could be observed that the translator did reflect
the political trend.
Also, due to decades of chaos in Vietnam, later on, and under the systematical
destruction of documents of the Japanese government, army and navy, many of the
facts and implementation were still hidden. The thesis is not able to unveil the entire
reality of Japan’s overseas Chinese policy in Southern Vietnam and French Indochina.
Still, based on the sources that could be accessed at the time, through the analysis and
reconstruction in this thesis, it may help the readers to understand more about the
background and consideration of Japan’s overseas Chinese work, overseas Chinese
role there, and the reason, reality behind the common misconception that we may have
been misled in those years.
In this thesis, although the theme and topic of it are to discuss Japan’s overseas
Chinese policy in Southern Vietnam. However, that was a title for the convenient of
readers’ understanding of the topic. At the time, Southern Vietnam, back then Cochinchina, was the most propertied region in the French Indochina, which was not
comparable with the rest of French Indochina. Moreover, in most of the documents,
researches and studies at the time (and even after), usually, French Indochina would
be described as a whole. Moreover, that was also the case of Japan’s policymaking
documents and records, even though they aimed to get control of resources, especially
the rice industry and rice market centered in Saigon and Cholon, in the region, which
equals to control Southern Vietnam.
Moreover, since overseas Chinese, no matter of its population or influence, were based
in Cochin-china (Southern Vietnam), to discuss the French Indochina overseas
Chinese as a whole, was not far from discussing the overseas Chinese in Southern
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Vietnam as an individual. So, for providing the whole picture of the issue, and to show
the significance of overseas Chinese in Southern Vietnam, it was inevitable to also
included to discussion of French Indochina and overseas Chinese there as a whole,
since the materials, sources and studies related to the topic, were all focused on
“French Indochina” as a whole. Still, this thesis kept the sense of focusing of overseas
Chinese in Southern Vietnam, which was reflected in the content of the thesis.
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1. FRENCH INDOCHINA OVERSEAS CHINESE SOCIETY BEFORE
THE INTRUSION OF JAPANESE ARMY
Overseas Chinese Population in French Indochina
Geo-politically adjacent to China, Vietnam was historically dominated by
China for more than a thousand years, from the Han dynasty in the 2nd century BC to
the Southern Han during the Five Dynasties. Centuries of Chinese rule also brought
Vietnam a long history of Chinese migrations. However, the first big wave, and
influential Chinese migration in Vietnam not started before the 17th century.44 From
the end of the 19th century, as with the other Southeast Asian regions, the number of
Chinese immigrants gradually increased.
For identification, there were three groups of Overseas Chinese communities
exists in Vietnam. Firstly of all, no different from other South East Asian regions, the
Overseas Chinese community in Vietnam divided into Kieu Sinh ¨% and New
Migrants ].. Kieu Sinh, refers to those born outside of China (born in French
Indochina/ Vietnam in this case), while New Migrants were newcomers who moved
into Vietnam after the 20th century. The former are mainly businesspeople and
capitalists, while the latter are mainly workers. Many of the New Migrants were
originated from Guangdong and Fujian. The third group was Minh Huong P/Pl,
the descendants of ancient Chinese migrants, who lived in Vietnam for generations.45
Minh Huong were usually hybrids with the locals. Most of the Kieu Sinh and Minh
Huong, usually have less interest to current China’s issues, and attached more
importance in the protection of their personal interest and properties in Vietnam, under
French colonial governance and regulations, while most of the New Migrants bound
their political interest with the mainland China, more engaged in the political
movements within China. Therefore, when the Japanese occupied the home provinces
of overseas Chinese in China, the New Migrants were shocked and fell into the panic,
for worrying their ancestors’ tomb to be destroyed by the Japanese. Comparatively,
the New Migrants were more concerned about changes in the situation in Mainland
China, such as the escalation of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression
and the establishment of the New Nationalist government in Nanjing.46
According to a survey by the Chinese Government's Overseas Chinese Affairs
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Committee in 1934, the total number of overseas Chinese in the world was about 7.8
million (778,617).47 Among them, 6.2million lived in Southeast Asia, and 381,471 of
them lived in French Indochina From French government’s investigation.4849 In
other words, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia accounted for 77% of the world's
overseas Chinese, while the French Indochina overseas accounted for 6.3% and
accounted for 4.8% of the world's overseas Chinese. The overseas Chinese population
of French Indochina is the fourth largest in Southeast Asia after Thailand, Malaya, and
Indonesia in Southeast Asia.50
Around 50%(52%) 51 of the overseas Chinese in French Indochina are
concentrated in the Cochin-china. Cochin-china is a relatively new developed region
in Vietnam. At the end of the 17th century, the former retainers of Ming dynasty with
their families migrated to Vietnam and collectively naturalized to the Nguyen’s
Vietnam, obeyed its order to move into the Cochin-china (southern Vietnam). As a
fertile plain, Cochin-china is suitable for rice agriculture. With matured waterway
transportation,52 led Cochin-china became the commercial center among the nearby
regions. Started from here, overseas Chinese development as the dominator of the
regional economy gradually.
After the Sino-Japanese War spread to southern China, through Hong Kong,
Chinese refugees escaped from their hometown, mainly Guangdong and Fujian, and
entered French Indochina. As a result, at the end of 1930s, the overseas Chinese
population had reached another peak.

53

Mainly lived in the seven major cities of

French Indochina., which were Cholon, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Haiphong, Hoa and Da
Nang, which occupied 36% of the total overseas Chinese population in French
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Indochina.54 Overseas Chinese’s population was concentrated mainly in the southern
part of French Indochina.55 Cholon (which means the embankment), in which, had the
most significant overseas Chinese population, which was managed and operated by a
unique autonomous system, and was the economic center of the southern, if not the
entire French Indochina. Cochin-china and Cambodia rice products will be
concentrated in the rice mills of Cholon and then transported to Saigon Port for export.
The importance of overseas Chinese of Cholon was recognized by Japan very early.
For example, the Osaka Asahi Shimbun on August 14, 1941, it believes that the
overseas Chinese of Cholon is the most important key to solving the economic
problems of the French Indochina because the overseas Chinese of Cholon had utterly
controlled the local rice trade and rice industry.56 Overseas Chinese of Cholon had
become a dominant force that even the French Indochina government cannot shake
easily.57
On the other hand, the overseas Chinese who live in the northern part of French
Indochina where borders southern China, were minorities, compared with the overseas
Chinese who live in the southern cities, such as Saigon and Cholon. In the northern
French Indochina, the overseas Chinese population was only accounted for 11% of the
total overseas Chinese population of French Indochina, which was after that of Cochinchina and Cambodia.58 The overseas Chinese population in the north concentrated in
Haiphong, where the starting point the "Chiang's Aid Route Ǹ26(" in French
Indochina. There were some possible reasons for this:
1. The importance of trade in the northern French Indochina (northern Vietnam)
was not comparable to the Cochin-china. The overseas Chinese in the northern
French Indochina were mostly were agents or importers and exporters of
foreign companies, which did not grow into influential power. 59
2. The small business in the northern French Indochina was mainly engaged by
local Vietnamese, instead of overseas Chinese.
3. Moreover, the economic scale there was not as attractive to overseas Chinese

54

Zhao Shunwen(trans.), Overseas Chinese Studies, 1984(trans.), 98.
Ibid.
56
Overseas Chinese in Cholon: The dominant of overseas Chinese in rice agencies ショロンにおけ
る華僑-仏印の米を掌握牢固たる集荷機構, Osaka Asahi Shimbun 大阪朝日新聞, 1941.8.14.
57
Tang Wen Rui 唐文瑞, “Overseas Chinese Rice Merchants in Vietnam 越南華僑米商之現狀”,
Economic Monthly 經濟學月刊, 1934, vol.1, no.3, 3-4.
58
Zhao Shunwen(trans.), Overseas Chinese Studies, 1984(trans.), 95.
59
Yang Jiancheng (ed.), Overseas Chinese in French Indochina, 196.
55

22

as Cochin-china.60
4. Unlike the Cochin-china, the Red River Delta was already over-populated with
the Vietnamese, where was the traditional core region of them, with the
different business model from the south. The commercial hegemony of
overseas Chinese therefore was not achieved in the north as they had got in the
south.61
5. Frequent typhoons of the Tonkin coast brought difficulties for the
transportation, compared with the Cochin-china coast.62
6. Southwest China regions next to the border of the northern French Indochina,
was lived by the non-Han minorities, which were not interest in migrating to
Vietnam. Also, they were not considered as the overseas Chinese.63

Overseas Chinese groups in French Indochina: Congregation
The origin of the congregation system in French Indochina can be traced back
to the Nguyen Dynasty of Vietnam. In 1787, for management, the Nguyen Dynasty
separated the overseas Chinese into Guangdong, Fujian, Teochew, and Hainan by the
origins of overseas Chinese (hometown) and dialects. Later, given the growth of
overseas Chinese power, it was later changed the four to Hokkien, Fuzhou, Teochew,
Guangzhou, Qiongzhou, Leizhou and Hainan 7 Congregations in 1814. 64 When
overseas Chinese live in more than 30 people, there is an obligation to organize a
congregation, which enjoy autonomy. The president of the congregation produces
through election by the members, who has the role as the mediator between the
overseas Chinese and the local government. Congregation president also has the duty
to maintaining the public order and collect the head taxes, business taxes from the
overseas Chinese communities. 65 Overseas Chinese enjoyed the same citizenship
rights as Vietnamese, while their military service and servitude are exempted.
After France took over Cochin-china in 1874, to manage the massive overseas
Chinese population there (around 500,000)66, the French inherited the congregation
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system, as a mean to utilize the commercial network of overseas Chinese merchants
in the regional economy, to strengthen their power. 67 In Saigon, French Indochina
government reorganized the overseas Chinese into seven congregations of Guangzhao,
Hokkien, Fuzhou, Hakka, Hainan, Qiongzhou, and Teochew, and established the
Union of Seven Congregations  M  N to handle all of the overseas Chinese
affairs. 68 Until 1885, the colonial government merged Fuzhou with Hokkien
congregations, Hainan with Qiongzhou congregations. Therefore the congregation
system was changed to the five-congregation system of Canton, Hokkien, Teochew,
Hainan, and Hakka. 6970 The Union of Seven Congregations, however, was still
maintained. In 1906, the congregation system became an official institute according to
the governor’s order of French Indochina.71
The congregations from different origins have different features as below:72
1. Canton Congregation was the largest among the Congregations of French
Indochina, which accounted for 50% of the overseas Chinese in entire
French Indochina. Most of the Cantonese in French Indochina were from
the Northwest of Guangdong province, who were mostly engaged in the
rice industry and commerce, and include labor, mechanics, and boat
workers.
2. Hokkein Congregation was the largest Congregation after the Canton
Congregation in French Indochina accounted for 20% of the total number
of overseas Chinese in French Indochina. Mainly from the southern Fujian,
especially Xiamen. Although its population is less than that of Canton, its
influence and business strength in the refined rice industry were even more
advantageous than the Canton Congregation.
3. The third is Hainan Congregation, mostly from Wenchang, usually, work
in the hotels and catering.
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4. The fourth is Teochew Congregation, which is composed of local origins
from Chaozhou in the eastern Guangdong. Most of the Teochew engaged
in transportation, foreign trade, insurance, trade and other industries.
5. The last one is the Hakka Congregation. In French Indochina, the Hakkas
were mainly engaged in forestry, ore collection and agriculture. Different
from those from the same provinces such as Canton and Hokkien
Congregations, Hakka congregations were composed by the people of
several provincial origins.
Above this, as mentioned, the French Indochina government established the
Union of Seven CongregationsMN in Cholon, which handles all the affairs of
the five congregations of French Indochina. Zhang Zhen-fan, origin from Hokkien and
born in French Indochina, was the president of the Union of Seven Congregations
when the Japanese troop's intrusion in the French Indochina. However, due to the small
scale of population, the overseas Chinese living in Tonkin and Annan only divided
into Canton, Hokkien and Yunnan Congregations. In the other areas, congregations
were not required to be established, if the overseas Chinese population does not exceed
the designated number. Instead, the overseas Chinese there will be under the
management of the Chinese Association.
In addition to the above five congregations, there is also the “Minh Huong
Society” in French Indochina. The Nguyen Dynasty once regarded Minh Huong as a
part of the overseas Chinese, divided them into different groups according to the
origins as same as the overseas Chinese. However, the Nguyen Dynasty reviewed them
as Vietnamese in 1828, ordered them to set up the Minh Huong Societies. Since then,
Minh Huong was separated from the other overseas Chinese. Still, Minh Huong
enjoyed the exemption from military service and servitude, which was also the
privileges of overseas Chinese. However, more than that, Minh Huong only have to
pay the head tax as half of that of overseas Chinese. It showed that Minh Huong was
considered as politically equivalent to Vietnamese under the rule of the Nguyen
Dynasty.73
Most of the Sino-Vietnamese marriages was between the overseas Chinese
men and local Vietnamese women. Most of the overseas Chinese men married with
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Vietnamese women have the bilingual language skill or learned to speak Vietnamese,74
which they were able to communicate with the Vietnamese and get access to the local
economic network, and therefore served as the mediator between the French colonist
and the Vietnamese colonized people economically.
In addition to the congregations, there were different types of overseas Chinese
associations organized in French Indochina. To roughly classify, they could be divided
into two major categories: business (industrial and commercial) associations and
political associations. The business organizations, in principle, organized by the fellow
workers, and do not relate to the origin of the members, which have the function of
protecting the interests of members economically. However, in actual practice, since
it was usual for the overseas Chinese from particular area monopolizing specific
industry or commerce. Therefore, the overseas Chinese business organizations also
contained robust nature of regional identity as the clan groups.75 For this reason, the
overseas Chinese business associations were as same as the congregations, were
organizations established to protect the vested interests from the outsiders. Before the
Chinese consulate was set up in Vietnam, it is not an exaggeration to say that the
overseas Chinese business associations and the congregations, together dominated the
overseas Chinese community in French Indochina.
In French Indochina, following the expansion of the economic activities, and
the growing population of the second-generation overseas Chinese, the identity of
overseas Chinese was changing gradually. After the Sino-Japanese War broke out,
immigration from China increase rapidly, and the scale of the congregation had also
expanded. Therefore, although the role congregation is still significant, it was
gradually weakening as the changing structure of the overseas Chinese population.
Instead, the role of the business associations which have similar functions, turning
increasingly important, as it united overseas Chinese beyond the identity of hometown
fellowship.76
The examples of the expanding influence of the overseas Chinese business
associations in French Indochina were the Chinese General Association in Vietnam77
and the Chinese General Federation of Trade Unions in Vietnam, which were the
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industrial and commercial overseas Chinese organizations respectively. 78

The

Chinese General Association in Vietnam, established in January 1900, was initially
called General Trade Association Overseas Chinese in Cochin-china 79 . It was the
composition of different guilds, with the purpose of protecting the interests of overseas
Chinese and to manage the overseas Chinese population. The board of the Chinese
General Association in Vietnam was organized by seven members from the Canton
congregation, five from the Hokkien and Teochew congregation, and six from the
Hainan congregation. Initially served for adjusting the price of goods in Saigon and
Cholon, later on, the influence of the Chamber extended throughout Cochin-china. In
1925, it became a large institution which got 3,368 companies and 12,000 stores as
members.8081
Organized by the labor unions, such as rice milling union and infrastructure
labor union, the Chinese General Federation of Trade Unions in Vietnam was
established in 1924’s Cholon. Other of the two business groups above, there were also
the other organizations like the Association of Overseas Chinese Journalists in
Vietnam active in French Indochina.82
In contrast to the business associations, there are also overseas Chinese
political associations in French Indochina. The branch of the Kuomintang in Cholon
was established by the Kuomingtang member from Guangdong in 1922. The branch
received the support of many overseas Chinese labors. The number of Kuomintang
members overgrow in Cochin-china, which had reached 14,000 by 1924.83
In addition to the influential overseas Chinese associations mentioned above,
there were also Annan Overseas Chinese National Salvation Association, Saigon, and
Cholon Comrades Rescue Congress, Overseas Chinese Education Association,
Women's Education Association, active in French Indochina.84
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Those above overseas Chinese associations, with their considerable power,
were strong resistance power anti-Japan before Japan’s intrusion ("entering and
stationing") in French Indochina. As for the Chinese General Association in Vietnam
and the Chinese General Federation of Trade Unions in Vietnam, they were back then
institutes that dominated French Indochina commerce and industry. In particular, the
Chinese General Association in Vietnam, in which more than 20 guilds were placed
under its protective umbrella with various kinds of chambers.85 Not only it was an
active organization that monopolized the interests of overseas Chinese, but it was
speculated to obtain considerable significance politically, which supported by the fact
that the president of the General Association from 1938-39, Zhang Zhen-fan, was also
appointed as the political commissar of the National Government.86 At the same time,
many members of the Chinese General Association in Vietnam were also
Kuomintang’s members. Through these political connections with the Chongqing
National Government, it could be proved that the influence of some overseas Chinese
association beyond individual economic or political aspects, and turn into the
autonomy institute of overseas Chinese that dominated the power and interest of the
overseas Chinese society in French Indochina.87

The economic role of overseas Chinese in French Indochina
Among the various economic activities of the Chinese in Indochina, the most
influential is the rice industry, which was overseas Chinese’s power base. In the
economy of French Indochina, especially within the rice trading and rice industry in
French Indochina, centered in Cholon, French have to rely on the overseas Chinese.88
The overseas Chinese involved in the rice economy there could be divided into four
groups below: 89
1. Rice traders - rice processors,
2. Rice traders,
3. Rice brokers and rice buyers,
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4. Rice traders and miller owned factories, which mill rice and sold the final product
to rice exporters.
Rice brokers and rice buyers buy rice and paddy from the villages or the rural
markets, not using their capital, but a loan from the middlemen. It was the typical
commercial practice in Cochin-china. The rice brokers/ buyers usually have marriage
the local Vietnamese women,90 to earn their trust, and to further use the commercial
network of the local community.
There were about a hundred rice traders in Cholon. They mainly export rice to
India and organized guilds and other associations. As a result of that, the overseas
Chinese monopolized the rice market; it was impossible to buy rice without going
through these overseas Chinese Rice traders.91
Many rice mills are also involved in rice exports. French Indochina rice
industry was concentrate in Saigon, and so most of the rice mill and industries were
also located in Cholon, the largest town in the Mekong Delta where rice is concentrated
and exported.92 According to a newspaper article in 1941, overseas Chinese have 63
rice mills in Cholon, 8 in other parts of Cochin-china, 6 in Tonkin, and 1 in Tourane.
The French owns only three factories in Cholon, but they were not comparable to those
above. It could be said that the rice industry in Cholon was almost monopolized by the
overseas Chinese.
Benefited from the effective distribution of work and mature trade network,
Indochina's rice economy was completely under the control of the overseas Chinese.
No outsiders were economically compatible with the Chinese. Small-scaled
Vietnamese rice business was limited to specially designated areas of the overseas
Chinese.93 Owing to the language barrier, it was difficult for the Europeans to trade
with the indigenous people in French Indochina. However, the overseas Chinese who
acquired the commercial and social network of the indigenous community served as
the mediator in between.9495
It can be seen from the above that the trading of rice and paddy in French
Indochina is exclusively owned by the overseas Chinese businessmen. Overseas
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Chinese’s relative strength of business network and organization helps them
monopolized the local economy. At that time, the overwhelming power of overseas
Chinese in the rice distribution agency and rice trading, as well as in the report of the
French Indochina government, "The 1919 Rice Crisis". Rice occupied most of the
export trade of French Indochina, which rice exported to Hong Kong, Shanghai, Japan
and other places through the overseas Chinese. French Indochina economy was
dependent in rice export, while in around 1929, over 70%9697 of the French Indochina
rice export was transported through the overseas Chinese of Cholon, and more than
50% of the exported rice was shipped to China through Hong Kong.98 It further proved
the unshakable hegemony of overseas Chinese in rice economy of French Indochina
at the time.

French Indochina’s overseas Chinese policy and Congregation System
In the early days of French colonial rule, the French Indochina regime actively
carried out the work of integrating overseas Chinese into the colonial system, starting
from managing policy. After the Cochin-china complete fell to the French, in 1874,
the French Indochina government reorganized the congregation system to rule over
the overseas Chinese.
Worrying the growth of overseas Chinese influences, the French Indochina
regime adopted the “divide and rule” policy, re-edited the overseas Chinese from 4 to
7 congregations of Canton, Hokkien, Fuzhou, Hakka, Hainan, Qiongzhou, and
Teochew. French colonial government also established the "Union of Seven
Congregations" for administering the affairs above all of the congregations. In 1885,
the French Indochina regime merged Fuzhou Congregation into Hokkien
Congregation, Qiongzhou Congregation into Hainan Congregation, and changed to the
Five-congregation system of Canton, Hokkien, Teochew, Hainan, and Hakka. Still,
the "Union of Seven Congregations" got preserved.99 According to the order of the
Governor of Cochin-china, in 1906, the Congregations became a formal institute and
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were designated into five as Canton, Hokkien, Teochew, Hainan, and Hakka legally.
Immigrants from China, were obliged to join one of the above five groups based on
their origins and language when they entry Cochin-china. The congregations were
considered as the body corporate and were allowed to own the real estate property. In
1935, confirmed by the French Indochina Governor's Order, the congregation system
was implemented throughout the French Indochina.100 Led by congregation president
and deputy president, in a certain extent, the collective autonomy of overseas Chinese
in French Indochina has been recognized. In principle, at least one congregation was
required to set up in each province. If there are too many members within a
congregation, it will set up a sub-congregation. In principle, the congregation members
joined for more than two years were exempted from the business tax and the head tax.
The presidents and deputy's presidents were produced through the elections, however,
requires the official recognition from the French Indochina authority.
There were specific duties and privileges as a congregation president. First of
all, the congregation president must maintain the public order of the overseas Chinese
community, have the right of policing over his congregation members. Congregation
presidents were responsible for compiling congregation members’ status, for instance,
the name list, bills, registrations of deaths, a record going abroad or escapes, and
submit that information as the report to the French Indochina authorities. These reports
were required to be updated once every three months, report to the governor and the
immigration officers. The reports would be compared to the old one and implied
management strictly. Also, the president of the congregation is the intermediary who
communicates between congregation members and the government of French
Indochina. They also have the dominant power over the congregation members and
were given the authority to exile their congregation members from Indochina when
necessary. Second, the congregation president has the duty as tax collector, to impose
the head tax on the congregation members for the French Indochina authorities, deliver
the taxes received from his members to the regime. In return, the congregation
president could take 0.5% of the head tax collected by himself, which also exempt his
head tax, and give him a free identification paper.101 The congregation president needs
to cover the cost of returning to China for his congregation member whom got expelled
by the French Indochina authorities and therefore removed from the congregation.
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However, the congregation president also has to afford the payment of the possible
treatment fee after the entry of the congregation member. It can be seen that the
responsibilities of the congregation president were not only for the individual but the
corresponding overseas Chinese community.
For the French Indochina overseas Chinese, Congregation provided a
guarantee of survival for those who have no place to survive in the local area initially.
Until 1935, before the establishment of the formal Chinese Consulate in Saigon,
Chinese diplomatic institutions were absent in the French Indochina.
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congregations, which have the power to the exit-entry and immigration affairs of
overseas Chinese, in this sense, played the role of an informal diplomatic institution.
The French Indochina government has turned the mutual aid groups that were initially
spontaneous among overseas Chinese into the institutionalized administrative
organizations and implemented its rule over local overseas Chinese under the
Congregation system.

After decades under the congregation system, the long-term from division had
led to the conflicts between different congregations from different origins. Political,
economic or even emotional conflicts occur among the congregations frequently. 103
On the one hand, it weakened oversea Chinese threat to the colonial government of
France, and on the other hand, it also explained why the overseas Chinese could not
unify together to against Japanese under its “divide and rule” policy inherited from
French.
Differ from the common understanding of overseas Chinese, nationalism or the
emotion towards the motherland is necessary; however, other factors, such as
bloodline, communities, fellowship, survival and economic interest also have
significant influence to their choice. Notably, the regional identity of Cantonese and
Hokkien, lead to struggle and conflicts between the congregations and overseas
Chinese from two origins. The failure and later purge of the Cantonese clique lead by
Wang Jingwei within the Nationalist Party, had led some of the Cantonese overseas
Chinese in French Indochina turned to sympathizer of Wang Jingwei, who have long
time of connection and friendship with the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast
Asia, especially the overseas Chinese from Canton in Vietnam, since the revolution
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movement of Sun Yat-sen in the late Qing.104 Wang, who accumulated high authorities
among the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, became an influential potential ally for
Japan to win over the support of the overseas Chinese.

Chapter 1 Summary
Chapter 1 outlined the overview of the overseas Chinese society before Japan’s
intrusion into French Indochina. The population of the overseas Chinese only
accounted for no more than 2% of the total population of French Indochina in the
1940s. However, overseas Chinese obtained a significant amount of economic power
through their hegemony in the rice economy, with their monopoly in rice industry and
rice distribution agencies.
The colonial government of French Indochina reorganized the congregation
system, the traditional hometown groups of the overseas Chinese in Vietnam,
governance overseas Chinese through the congregation system. Unlike the Vietnamese,
overseas Chinese have been given privileges for economic freedom, as the French
Indochina government aimed to utilize their economic strengths as mediators and tax
collectors, to develop and benefit from the local economy, especially in the rice
industry.
For the French Indochina government, the congregation system is mean to
govern overseas Chinese. However, in contrast, for the overseas Chinese newly arrive
French Indochina, who does not have any family/ blood relationship that can rely on,
the congregation at least provided them with a survival guarantee.
In addition to the congregation system, there were still other overseas Chinese
associations, such as the commerce and industrial associations. These associations not
only have the function of protecting the economic interests of overseas Chinese but
were also the cornerstone of overseas Chinese unite their regional identity to against
external forces that violate their interests. With the expansion of the economic
activities and the growing number of second generation overseas Chinese (Qiaosheng
¨ % ) born in French Indochina, the role congregation system has started to be
replaced by the associations mentioned above. To solve the problems beyond the
congregation level, the role of the Chinese General Association in Vietnam becomes
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stronger and stronger. However, the division caused by the congregation system had
also led to the conflict within the overseas Chinese society. A regional identity which
strengthened by the official recognized, long-term congregation system, weakened the
unity of the overseas Chinese in French Indochina as a whole, and profoundly
influenced the choice of overseas Chinese from different origin after Japan’s influence
arrived.
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2. FEATURES OF OVERSEAS CHINESE IN FRENCH INDOCHINA
BEFORE THE INTRUSION OF THE JAPANESE TROOPS
This chapter discussed the anti-Japanese movement of overseas Chinese in
French Indochina, at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. Started from the end of
the 19th century, due to Japan’s expansion of its influence China, various kinds of
military, political and economic conflicts were between Sino-Japanese civil and
official level. As a result of the hostility, anti-Japanese movements broke out
frequently within and out of China.105 After the start and intensification of the widespread Sino-Japanese War, anti-Japanese mobilization was also influenced the
overseas Chinese societies in Southeast Asia profoundly. From the waves of antiJapanese movements, we will discuss how French Indochina overseas Chinese got
influenced and respond in this stage.
Long before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, within China, there were
numerous times of anti-Japanese movements, including the boycotting of Japanese
goods. Starting from the Tatsumaru Incident in 1908 to the starting of Sin-Japanese
War, the boycotting movement against Japan had at least 30 years of history in China,
while more than ten times of boycotting launched in nation-wide scale.106
Linked with the anti-Japanese movement in China, Southeast Asia, where have
the largest overseas Chinese population in the world, had launched their anti-Japanese
movement respectively to respond. Anti-Japanese movement, other from boycotting,
also included the cutting off of relation with Japan (Japanese) and the fundraising for
aiding China. Reorganized in 1919The Kuomintang (The Chinese Nationalist Party)
had a deep understanding to overseas Chinese’s importance economically, obtained
the traditional friendship with the overseas Chinese societies, and see them and their
capital as a leading force which can construct the nation. Thence, overseas Chinese’s
anti-Japanese movements were gradually organized under the guidance of the
Kuomintang. In 7th July 1937, after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Sino-Japanese
War officially started. The hometown of most of the overseas Chinese, Guangdong
and Fujian, was occupied by Japan successively soon after the war. In 11th October,
the representatives of overseas Chinese organizations in Southeast Asia established
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the Nanyang Federation of China Relief Fund [b¨Ä¯wÃ$¼ in
Singapore, for unify the “anti-Japanese and National Salvation movement” of all of
the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, aiding the Kuomintang government relocated
to Chongqing, through fundraising and donation, with continuing the boycotting on
Japanese goods. 107108
From the anti-Japanese movements mentioned above, influence on overseas
Chinese in Southeast Asia could be observed. However, from the back then
newspapers, the majority of the anti-Japanese movements reports were about Malaya,
Singapore, Philippines or Thailand. The news about French Indochina overseas
Chinese’s anti-Japanese movements was absent in this stage. It was speculated to be
the scale of anti-Japanese activities is relatively small, which failed to attract the
concern from China comparatively. It was recorded that, at the time of August 1937,
overseas Chinese responses to the Incident in Saigon was quite calm. There are no
special obstacles to commercial transactions.109 The reason of it was also record in the
report, in which, the commissioner of the Kuomintang government processing the
Although the Nanjing government commissioner did not publicly guide the overseas
Chinese, it was "undoubtedly very active underground", while at the same time, the
overseas Chinese anti-Japanese movement was suppressed by the French colonial
government in Cochin-china, by prohibiting the mass gatherings and demonstration.110
Still, influenced by the anti-Japanese propaganda of the Chinese newspaper
there, Saigon overseas Chinese launched the boycotting against Japanese goods, and
refuse to sell their products to Japan. Japanese were being attacked, by throwing of
stones or beer can. Overseas Chinese anti-Japanese movement was quite active there
in August. In the report, it also reported that until December, in Hanoi and Haiphong,
the overseas Chinese there made the underground regulations with 3000 refugees, to
thoroughly implement the campaign of boycotting the Japanese goods, and impose
penalties such as fines or exiles on the violators. However, owing to the strict ban from
the French Indochina authorities, besides the overseas Chinese, common people there
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do not participate in it. 111 Still, in Cholon, where overseas Chinese population
concentrate, “anti-Japanese propaganda was everywhere,” while on 13th March 1938,
there were anti-Japanese and Sun Yat-sen memorial demonstration participates by
serval thousands of overseas Chinese; later, on 9th June, the anti-Japanese associations
forcibly entered and investigated a Taiwanese Tea shop.112
When the Jinan Incident occurred in 1928, there were three influential overseas
Chinese organizations in French Indochina. They were the Chinese General
Association of Commerce in Vietnam (founded 1900), the Chinese General Federation
of Trade Unions in Vietnam (founded 1924) and the (Chinese) Kuomintang Annam
branch founded 1922 in Cholon. The anti-Japanese movements were led by the
Chinese General Federation of Trade Unions in Vietnam, later on, the Kuomintang
Annam branch took the lead by its political influence and authority among the overseas
Chinese in French Indochina.
Following the outbreak of Manchurian Incident and Sino-Japanese War, not
only the Mainland Chinese but also the overseas Chinese societies in Southeast Asia,
have a strong sense of “National Crisis.” As a response, the overseas Chinese expanded
the anti-Japanese movement, with formal organizations. At the same time, the
Nationalist Government of China called the overseas Chinese in entire Southeast Asia
for organizing the anti-Japanese-national-salvation organizations, through the network
of news.
In French Indochina, right after the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War, in 1st
August 1937, the Cochin-china General Association of Overseas Chinese for National
Salvation [[<¨¼113 was established in Cholon. The society was
organized by the influencing overseas Chinese groups in French Indochina included
the Kuomintang Annam branch, the Chinese General Association of Commerce in
Vietnam, and the Union of Seven Congregations. The Cochin-china General
Association of Overseas Chinese for National Salvation, therefore, put all the antiJapanese movements of the overseas Chinese in Cochin-china under its supervision
and set up 35 branches. 77 overseas Chinese organizations were joining the General
Association, with 75 overseas Chinese companies and banks. The president was served
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by Zhang Zhen-fan, while the standing committee was the influential overseas Chinese
figure such as Zhu Jixing3Å¸, the Chairman of the Chinese General Association of
Commerce in Vietnam and Yanzijun ¿Z. It can be said that the Cochin-china
General Association of Overseas Chinese for National Salvation integrated the force
of overseas Chinese in all over French Indochina, and actively launched its antiJapanese movement.114

There were the eight objectives of the Cochin-china General Association of Overseas
Chinese for National Salvation [[<¨¼:115
1. Guide the overseas Chinese to support China
2. Organize the overseas Chinese for aiding China
3. Collect the National Salvation public debt and the fundraising for the national
salvation and the victims of war.
4. Mobilize the economic, materialistic, labor and intelligence for helping the
motherland of China
5. Launch the boycotting movements on Japanese goods
6. Destroy traitor’s plots
7. Expand the promoting of propaganda for the national salvation movement
8. Cultivating cadres for the anti-Japanese national salvation movement

Besides the boycotting movement on Japanese goods and fundraising activities,
overseas Chinese started their anti-Japanese propaganda in French Indochina
gradually. At the time, there were ten newspapers issued by Chinese in French
Indochina, which each issue number ranged from 300 to 500. Most of the news was
about anti-Japanese news. Also, 700 overseas Chinese schools use textbooks
containing anti-Japanese content. Attacks on Japanese people have occurred in various
parts of French Indochina, such as Saigon.116117
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The Outcome of the anti-Japanese movement of overseas Chinese in French
Indochina
In the first part, the anti-Japanese movements of French Indochina’s overseas
Chinese were discussed. The anti-Japanese movements within China influenced entire
Southeast Asia. Among them, it was primarily the Chinese community in French
Indochina which next to the Southern part of China.
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the nationalist government of
China invited the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia to raise the Military expenses.118
As a result, massive amount of financial aids from the overseas Chinese were sent to
the Chongqing National Government. However, other from the Chongqing National
Government, some Overseas Chinese also provided aids to the Chinese Communist
Party. However, the data about it was absent.
From July 1937 to September 1939, French Indochina overseas Chinese
donated 4400000 yuan to the Kuomintang government, which was the fifth most
significant amount of donation in Southeast Asia, after British Malaya, Philippines,
Dutch East Indies and Thailand. From January 1938 to December 1940, French
Indochina overseas Chinese donated 6500000yuan and jumped to the fourth.
According to the investigation of the Indochina Expedition Army of Japan, in the five
years after the Sino-Japanese War started, the total amount of overseas Chinese was
17191869 yuan. There were various kinds of Overseas Chinese fundraising to aid their
motherland, included the “Daily Cent” Movement and the “Dieting donation
campaign.” 119 The “Daily Cent” Movement, could raise about 90000 yuan monthly,
which the total donation yearly was able to buy six fighter aircraft. Including the
“Dieting donation campaign,” the total donation yearly was able to buy 12 fighter
aircraft.120
However, based on the fragmental records, it was quite impossible to get the
whole picture and the exact, unify numbers of the overseas Chinese fundraising
movements. Although the overseas Chinese donation does not have a unified and exact
number, however, the contributions from overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia,
including the French Indochina, was financially the primary factor that supports the
Chongqing National Government’s resistance in the beginning of the anti-Japanese
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war.
After the start of the Sino-Japanese War, overseas Chinese immigrants and
refugees to French Indochina rapidly increased in the 1930s. Overseas Chinese
population was mainly concentrated in the cities such as Cholon and Saigon. Like the
other part of Southeast Asia, the French Indochina overseas Chinese actively launched
the anti-Japanese movement and the boycotting movement of Japanese goods. On the
other hand, the overseas Chinese who dominated the French Indochina economy, have
caused friction with the local Vietnamese due to their growing population and
influence.121
At that time, the French Indochina was the most significant route of material
transportation in the “Chiang's Aid Route." The Japanese government has requested
the French government to close the route. Correspondingly, the French government
banned the transmission of munitions on the route in October 1937 as a response.
However, after the French government announced the ban on the supply of munitions,
the supply of various munitions continued. 122 Moreover, about the boycotting
movement, and the cutting off of economic relations with Japan, was in fact, welcomed
by the French officials since they want to 123

Chapter 2 Summary
This chapter discussed the anti-Japanese movements of the overseas Chinese
in French Indochina from the start of the Sino-Japanese War to Japan’s intrusion in
northern French Indochina. From the end of the 19th century to Japan’s intrusion, there
has been constant friction between Japanese companies and the overseas Chinese
because of economic competition and political relations between China and Japan. The
overseas Chinese in French Indochina, who are geographically and culturally adjacent
to their home country, have launched widespread anti-Japanese movements, intimately
connected with China, due to the convenience of the conditions. Since the Jinan
Incident in 1928, the overseas Chinese in French Indochina took the Vietnam Overseas
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Chinese Federation of Trade Unions as the center and actively engaged in the antiJapanese movements in economic means, such as the boycotting of Japanese goods
and to cut off the financial relationship with Japanese companies.
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Kuomintang government
moved to Chongqing and received assistance from countries such as Britain and the
United States from their colonies in Southeast Asia via several routes. French
Indochina is one of the major routes, (Northern French Indochina: land route; Southern
French Indochina: sea route). This route not only transported military supplies from
the United Kingdom and the United States but was also used to carry donations and
materials for overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia to the Chongqing National
Government. The aid campaign of French Indochina has brought into the long-lasting
of the Sino-Japanese war.
Shortly after the start of the Sino-Japanese War, the overseas Chinese in French
Indochina launched an anti-Japanese movement in all parts of French Indochina.
Geographically, anti-Japanese activities of the southern French Indochina (Saigon)
where most overseas Chinese lived were the most active. Anti-Japanese activities of
overseas Chinese have a significant impact on the trade between Japan and French
Indochina. However, as in other parts of Southeast Asia, the overseas Chinese of
French Indochina was mainly composed of overseas Chinese who originated from
Guangdong and Fujian Province. After Japan captured the two provinces around 1938,
the attitude of the overseas Chinese in French Indochina began to change.
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3. JAPAN’S OVERSEAS CHINESE POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
With the long-term Sino-Japanese War and the changes of the international
political environment, Southeast Asia had become more and more crucial in Japan’s
Policy gradually, Japan’s concern on the region was also increasing. On the other hand,
from the early 20th century, Japan had faced various of anti-Japanese movements of
overseas Chinese, and the boycotting of Japanese good was a big blow to the Japanese
economy. As to solve its plight in expanding its economic influence in Southeast Asia,
and to achieve the early end of the Sino-Japanese War, the implement of overseas
Chinese work, had been viewed as the solution. From the late 1930s, the Japanese
government had paid high attention to the overseas Chinese who had significant
economic influence, different organs and institutes had done various kinds of overseas
Chinese research and studies. 124 Those research and studies, had cope with the
investigation of documents and field studies, successfully collect the information of
overseas Chinese as a result. From the researches and studies above, overseas
Chinese’s strength and weakness, and the political and economic relations between
overseas Chinese and China, the importance of overseas Chinese aid to China, and
how to stop overseas Chinese from aiding China were analyzed and discussed. The
focus of the above researches was mainly on economic and politics, which also
reflected Japan’s understanding of overseas Chinese problem at the time. The studies
of overseas Chinese in this period are at a preliminary stage. Many of them are
investigations of the current situation, and these studies can be divided into two
arguments:
1. To eliminate overseas Chinese people in business in the economic field.
2. To support the economic activities in Japan in Southeast Asia, Japan must
utilize overseas Chinese people in business.

The Transitions of Japan’s Overseas Chinese Policy in Southeast Asia
Actively engaged in different kinds of fundraising and anti-Japanese
movement to support their motherland, the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia launch
the new wave of anti-Japanese-national-salvation movement after 7th July 1937, the
broke out of the Sino-Japanese War. For achieving the early end of the war, to cut off
the relationship between overseas Chinese and China became essential for Japan. For
this aim, Japan had proposed its overseas Chinese work policy. The Organization of
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Overseas Chinese Propaganda Policy «¨\z formulated by the Standing
Committee of the Cabinet Intelligence Department on June 13, 1938, stated that "the
overseas Chinese support is an important reason for the Chiang’s long-term war of
resistance." Japan awarded that overseas Chinese support is crucial to the national
government’s war against Japan. In response to the development of the Sino-Japanese
War, this policy pointed out that to shake the overseas Chinese "people's heart towards
China" was an opportunity for Japan's overseas Chinese work. "The loss of the
confidence of the overseas Chinese on the Chiang regime, to build their reliance on
Japan, and to guide overseas Chinese to support for the new regime, is not only a mean
of weakness the Chiang regime but also for strengthening the new regime." In other
words, overseas Chinese work is an integral part of the Japan war policy in the SinoJapanese War, which was a necessary mean of supporting the new puppet regime, at
the time of 1938. It attempts to weakening the Chongqing National Government, cut
it off from the overseas Chinese and turn them into supportive force for Japan. Besides,
in economic aspect, it purposes on supporting the pro-Japanese regimes. It means
overseas Chinese were included in the political structure of the newly founded proJapan regime, and emphases to gain the insufficient resources by using overseas
Chinese in Southeast Asia. At the end of 1939, Japan’s overseas Chinese policy had
made a great change. In 1937, the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan stated
overseas Chinese as enemies, which Japan’s overseas Chinese policy back then was a
focus on economic competitions. However, with the long-term war, Japan has become
more aware of the importance of overseas Chinese, as a mean to end the Sino-Japanese
war as soon as possible. Getting cooperation from the overseas Chinese became a new
focus. However, at the time, since overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia were all under
the colonial rule, the specific work of overseas Chinese work at this time only stayed
at propaganda works.125
The Sino-Japanese War expanded all-over China in 1938. The United States,
which suffered damage of its rights and interests in China, began to impose economic
sanctions against Japan in January 1939. Later on, the United States announced the
abandonment of the "Japan-US Trade Navigation Treaty” on July 26 of the same year.
When "important (military) supplies" became more and more urgent for Japan, Europe
ushered in the outbreak of the Second World War in the same year. Soon, the
Netherlands in 15th May 1940, and France on 22nd June 1940, surrendered to Nazi
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Germany.126 Germany seems to be invincible on the European battlefield. In the Far
East, Japan’s goal was to establish the “self-sufficient economic circle” and to
establish the " Great East Asian New Order.” However, long-lasting Sino-Japanese
War interrupts all the plans of Japan. For its grand plan, Japan attempted to seize
French Indochina and Dutch East Indies, utilizing the power vacuum in Southeast Asia
colonies, after the defeat of their home countries on the European battlefield. It was
seen as the solution for the early end of the Sino-Japanese War and the realization of
a new East Asian order.127
Against the backdrop of these changes in international politics, on July 26,
1940, the Cabinet meeting of the Cabinet adjusted the basic national policy, to
complete the realization of the "Great East Asian New Order." On the 27th of the next
day, the Liaison Conference of Imperial Headquarters and Government decided The
Transition of the World Situation and the Outline for Dealing with Current Situation
g

7q=j. 128 In this document, it pointed out Japan

have to carry out friendly measures to the other nations in Southeast Asia and to turn
them into "coordinators" of Japan's work. On the other hand, it also stated the necessity
to "capture the opportunity and to exercise (Japan's) military strength in the South(East
Asia)", which refers to the idea of seeking the good opportunities, to “resolve” the
"Southern issue" and to end the Sino-Japanese war by its military strength. Also, the
outline of the foreign policy of the document, established and explained Japan’s policy
of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The "Southern Issue"(to occupy
Southeast Asia) is considered as the related issue of the "China Issue"(Sino-Japanese
War), and in the two “issues” above, overseas Chinese work was regarded as the key
solution.129
In the cabinet meeting on August 16, 1940, the Southern Economic Policy
Guidelines [¤ºaj,130 determined the basic policy of Japan's expansion
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to Southeast Asia, and also stipulated the economic policy of the South in the future.
In the "Guidelines," it is advocated to build a large economic circle in Southeast Asia,
to provide military resources for Japan, and strive to foster the political influence of
Japan in Southeast Asia to ensure Japan's economic advance and material distribution
in the region. Also, the document pointed out that when considering the policy on
Southeast Asia, Japan must pay attention to the overseas Chinese who dominated the
economy of Southeast Asia: "The movement of overseas Chinese is significant for the
overall situation and therefore must be guided."131 Although this document does not
directly formulate the overseas Chinese policy, it is to recognize the overseas Chinese
policy as the solution of the “Southern issue,” that is, the building of the Great East
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The document pointed out that the overseas Chinese work
was the extension of the "Southern Issues." The “Transition of the World Situation and
the Outline for Dealing with Current Situation” are linked to the "China Issues (SinoJapanese War)" which could be observed that Japan valued the overseas Chinese
problem as a critical topic.132
Given the changes in Japan’s understanding of overseas Chinese issues, the
Chinese overseas policy of Japan has to be changed accordingly. On July 10, 1941, in
the meeting of the officials of the relevant organs, the “Regulations on the Control of
Overseas Chinese Work in China” were abolished, replaced with the Outline of
measures toward overseas Chinese ¨áj. In response to the idea of the
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in the National Policy, the policy of the
“Outline of measures toward overseas Chinese” were, “to deal with the ‘China
Incident(the Sino-Japanese War)’, and to prepare for the empire's policy toward the
South(East Asia), to guide the overseas Chinese within the East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. To gradually separated the overseas Chinese from aiding the Chiang Kai-shek
forces, turn them as the assistance force, in establishing the East Asian Co-prosperity
Sphere, and to implement consistent and active measures in the central government
(Japan) and the local government." In other words, it re-confirmed the role of overseas
Chinese in solving the Sino-Japanese War and to handle overseas Chinese work
together with the “Southern issue.” In addition, in order to implement the “Southern
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Policy”, Japan government have established the policy of implementing consistent
overseas Chinese policy in the Central Government (Japan) and the local government,
cutting out Southeast Asian overseas Chinese from the Chongqing National
Government, and enabling overseas Chinese to assist/cooperate to build an "East Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere".

Following the above guidelines, Japan has developed the following outlines of the
overseas Chinese policy:133
1. French Indochina and Thailand would be the priority geographical focus of
overseas Chinese work. According to the expansion of the Japanese Empire,
the overseas Chinese work was planned to expand in the other regions
gradually.
2. The overseas Chinese work should be focused on economic issues. The
propaganda, political and economic policies have to be carefully matched with
imperial foreign policy and to propose "conformity" measures according to the
corresponding period, order, and method of the overseas Chinese’s background
of the place of residence and characteristics.
3. The work in China must strive for the establishment of “necessary political
conditions,” and the Chinese overseas policy in China should be consistent
with Imperial overseas Chinese policy, to unify the overseas Chinese policy.
4. To maintain the unity and consistency of overseas Chinese policy, close liaison
between the various agencies related to the Japanese side are as follows:
I.

In the central government, set up the conference F Ç  for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Army, the Navy, the East Asia
Development Board Koain ¸K{ and other relevant departments to
exchange work policies, policy agreements, and intelligence at any
time. The affairs of the other parties are the responsibility of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

II.

The guidance of the overseas Chinese work carried out by the National
Government of China is under the responsibility of (Japan's) Nanjing
Embassy, and other regions are carried out by the relevant authorities
in appropriate places by the local East Asia Development Board
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authorities and other agencies. The agreement set up by the relevant
officials of the relevant agencies of the policy will maintain close
contact with the Nanjing Embassy.
III.

It is carried out by Foreign Affair agencies on the agreement between
the army and navy in Southeast Asia.

The above guidelines have the following significances:
First, it placed French Indochina in a vital area of the overseas Chinese policy.
With the expansion of Japan in Southeast Asia and the implemental areas of overseas
Chinese policy have also expanded. In September 1940, the Japanese army intrusion
into the Indochina of France, at the time, the pro-Japanese government was in power
in Thailand. Considering that both places have been placed within Japan's sphere of
influence, it is natural that the above area was listed as the vital area.134
Second, the overseas Chinese policy is divided into three divisions: economic,
political and propaganda. Economic work was the primary policy among. In the
formulation of policies, it seems to be affected by the Southern Economic Policy
Guidelines. The Southern Economic Policy Guidelines focused on Southeast Asia,
aimed to complete the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere economically, and see
the acquisition of military supplies as its priority. Moreover, The Policy for the
development of the French Indochina Economy «8-¤ºo,f,a
pointed out that, to obtain military supplies, to get the cooperation from overseas
Chinese and to utilize overseas Chinese 's capital were indispensable, by the economy
of Southeast Asia was dominated by overseas Chinese at the time. From this document,
the policymaking of Japan regarded overseas Chinese work as part of the diplomatic
policy and stated to adopt the appropriate measures, after considering the local
situation and the trends of overseas Chinese in the region.135
Third, Japan’s attempt to strengthen the power of the Nanjing National
Government. The document stated the Nanjing National Government’s overseas
Chinese work must be unified with Japan. Japan had a high expectation on the Nanjing
National Government, especially Wang Jingwei, on their potential influence on the
overseas Chinese societies in Southeast Asia.136
Fourth, to unify the guiding of overseas Chinese work, the Ministry of Foreign
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Affairs concerning the overseas Chinese policy, the Army, the Navy, the East Asia
Development Board and other relevant agencies constituted a conference, for related
departments to communicate and exchange information. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
replaced the East Asia Development Board as the agency responsible for liaison
affairs.137
The above-mentioned "guidelines" basically divided the principle of overseas
Chinese work into the overseas Chinese work of China and the overseas Chinese work
of Southeast Asia. 138
To overseas Chinese in China, it points out two points below, which were, (1)
in the political and economic areas, especially in the Middle and Southern China,
where the hometown of overseas Chinese, especially allowed the local Chinese to
move freely, particularly, provide convenience for the overseas Chinese enterprises,
their investment and capital flows. The above measures were used for the benefit of
cooperation with the "(Nanjing) National Government. (2) ensure the consistency of
overseas Chinse policy through the Overseas Committee of the Nanjing National
Government, cooperate with the central government and the local government. 139
On the other hand, for the overseas Chinese work of Southeast Asia, there are
the following specific contents:
Regarding economic work, two specific programs were decided (1) for the
acquisition of necessary materials, and to strengthen the trade relation between Japan
and overseas Chinese, Japan attempted to cooperate with the powerful overseas
Chinese and their enterprises and to encourage the Japanese companies to enter the
Japanese occupied regions’ market. (2) To guide and organize the financial institutions,
for providing convince to the remittance and the flow of capital of overseas Chinese
in Japan’s sphere of influence. Both of the two points were for achieving economic
cooperation with the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, thus attracting the overseas
Chinese remittances and funds. In that, the Nanjing National Government was
expected to bear a considerable role.140
Regarding political work, there were mainly three points: (1) in order to
counter with Chongqing National Government’s overseas Chinese work organizations
and propaganda, the Japanese government has formulated the policy of intensifying
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the competition of overseas Chinese groups, to appease the strong overseas Chinese
groups, and instigate the overseas Chinese workman of Chongqing National
Government rebel to Japanese side. Also, Japan has also tried to organize the proJapanese overseas Chinese groups, to against with the Chongqing National
Government. (2) Organizing and expanding pro-Japan overseas Chinese working
groups, to form influential working groups and promoting propaganda activities by
acquiring the existing schools and cultural groups. (3) To support the overseas Chinese
work of the Nanjing National Government.141
Among the propaganda work, through the existing communication network
such as film shooting, radio broadcasting, news, to introduce Japan’s national strength,
with criticizing Chongqing National Government’s policies and performance, to
advocate the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Still, economic work has given
the highest priority. The guidelines aimed to prepare for Japan’s political base, to
complete Japan’s “mission” of the establishment of the “Greater East Asia CoProsperity Circle,” and to realize the “Emancipation of East Asia”, as to prepare for
the smooth implementation of Japan’s economic work, in which, the propaganda was
seen as the related work economic works.142
Right before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the basic ideas of Japan’s
overseas Chinese policies were to separate the overseas Chinese from the Chongqing
Nationalist Government, thus turning them into the assistance force that cooperates
with Japan. Aimed to build the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,” however,
in Southeast Asia, Japan limited the area of overseas Chinese policy only in French
Indochina and Thailand. It was based on the idea that although Japan joined the
alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, Japan tended to avoid the war with the
United States and Great Britain, before the outbreak of the Pacific War. The purpose
of Japan, at this point, was to take Thailand and French Indochina as its strategic bases,
while economically, to obtain the resource from Southeast Asia, especially those from
French Indochina, for the construction of the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere,” with assistance from overseas Chinese. Also, by military means, Japan
attempted to blockade the “Chiang(Kai-shek)’s aid Route.” For that, the cooperation
of the Nanjing Nationalist Government and the overseas Chinese work in Southeast
Asia is essential. Therefore, at this stage, Japan’s overseas Chinese policy was not only
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included the diplomatic policies but also included the implementation of policies
through existing governments.

Japan's Overseas Chinese Policy after the Beginning of the Pacific War:
Repression and Utilization under Military Administration
The consumptions of the long-lasting Sino-Japanese War, with the outbreak of
Pacific War in 8th December 1941, made the most urgent issue of Japan became the
occupation of the “South” (Southeast Asia), to obtain the insufficient resources of
Japan, such as oil, rubber, coal and rice/ food at the time.143 The "first policy" of the
report, the Southern Economic Countermeasures [¤º«j144 decided on
16th December 1941, divided Southeast Asia into "Southern A region" and "Southern
B region." According to the report, the "Southern A region" is the region where the
military administration was carried out, which were Dutch East Indies, British Malaya,
the Philippines, and Burma under the Japanese occupation. In contrast, the "Southern
B region," includes Thailand and French Indochina, do not implement the military
administration. Instead, it was considered to be the influence sphere, and under the
indirect control of Japan.145
In responding to the changing situation, the Japanese Government and Military,
with the Japanese armies in different areas, had mad their overseas Chinese policies,
according to the various situation of the corresponding regions. On the eve of the
Pacific war, the Base Camp Liaison Conference #»¾Ç decided the Details
of Measures for Administration of occupied area in the South [°15`Ýa
j°on November 20, 1941. 146 In this document, “the implementation of military
administration in the occupied territories, to restore the public order, and to rapidly
obtain the national defense resources, and to ensure the self-sufficiency of the troops
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stationed in different areas," 147148 in which, proposed three goal in the occupied
territories, leaded by the restoring of public order, to obtain the crucial resources in the
occupied territories to support Japan’s wartime consumption.149 Also, it proposed that
"the development of the occupied territories, with the acquisition of national defense
resources, to contribute to the plan of the central government.” “For the sake of the
national defense resources, and the self-sufficiency of the stationing troops, it must be
restrained in propaganda and while do not hinder the above purposes." Moreover, the
document also proposed the plan to encourage the local indigenous to rely on the
Japanese army, to win over their trust and dependence, and to avoid the early break
out of the indigenous independence movement, through Japan’s guidance. It pointed
out the priority of Japan’s policy was in obtaining the critical resources. For the
obtaining of those essential resources, Japan aimed to stabilize the occupied territories
through military suppression of the independence movements and military
administrations. It also showed that it was critical for Japan to ensure the resourcesupply base in Southeast Asia to under its control.
Also, the document stated “inducing the overseas Chinese to betray the Chiang
regime and to coordinate with Japan, to assist the implementation of the (further
overseas Chinese) policy,” which pointed out the significance of “tempting” the
overseas Chinese collaborators. It was also considered as to utilize overseas Chinese’s
economic strength for assisting the occupation. Corresponding to this, the Outline of
the Southern Operation and the Governance of the Occupied Territories [:Ġ+
7-°1Sj made by the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters
on November 25, 1941, has the same gist.150
After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the 25th Army of the Japanese Army
occupied British Malaya (including Singapore), where the largest and most influential
overseas Chinese society in Southeast Asia, on December 28, 1941. Hereafter, the 25th
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Army was responsible for the implementation of military governance for Malaya and
formulated the Implementation of Overseas Chinese Work  ¨  : Ý a j °
independently. 151 This document divided the process of Japanese occupation in
Malaya into three stages, describing the plans and outlines for implementing the
overseas Chinese work there. At the beginning of the document, it mentioned the aim
of the overseas Chinese work in Malaya was concerned about the movements of
overseas Chinese and takes the opportunity of the war, to process the fundamental
changes on the overseas Chinese work in the occupied territories, compared with the
previous "temptation works." It showed that the 25th Army had rejected the
"temptation work" on the overseas Chinese, turned to focus on "synchrony and
contribution" of overseas Chinese instead, probably because of the urgent needs of
acquiring the resources and capitals through the overseas Chinese, in the intensified
Pacific War.
In the Implementation of Overseas Chinese Work ¨:ªaj°, the first
stage was the “Outline of Emergency Countermeasures after the Occupation,” which
listed four guidelines. 152
First, to stop the “inducement work” on the overseas Chinese, but to give
preferential treatment to overseas Chinese collaborators. On the other hand, the
overseas Chinese who disobeyed were killed. Second, instead of persuasion, order the
overseas Chinese to hand over their capital, Third, accept “voluntary contributions.”
Fourth, to promote the implementation of the previous orders, “various methods” can
be used “freely.”153
The second stage is “the countermeasures after the end of the first phase of
combat.” There are four guidelines. First, for all overseas Chinese in Malaya, ordering
them to pay military expenses and a minimum of 5 million yen in funds; Second, to
order the overseas Chinese to pledge to cooperate with Japan fully. Third, for overseas
Chinese who do not cooperate with Japan, confiscate their property, exile those
overseas Chinese and their families to prohibit their re-entry and other callous
treatment. Fourth, offer protection to overseas Chinese who cooperated fully with
Japan, to secure their livelihood and safety.154
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The third stage is "The Future Policy and Outlines." The first is to attach the
importance of the strength of overseas Chinese, through suppression to let Japan could
fully use the strength of overseas Chinese; the second is to use the resources of
overseas Chinese; the third is to recognize the development and production of overseas
Chinese funds (occupation); "the use of strategy to led to the collapse of the Chongqing
National Government." The fifth is the command of all of the Chinese in the South.155
From these guidelines, it can be seen that the 25th Army had turned extremely
tough on overseas Chinese, and planned to kill the disobedience overseas Chinese. It
was speculated that their purpose was to threaten the overseas Chinese, to stop their
resistance movement and turned to be obedience under Japan’s military administration.
Still, the military government in British-Malaya occupied territory considered
overseas Chinese as an indispensable part of the grand war plan, which is the third
stage, "the command of all southern Chinese overseas" was planned, and here great
importance of social influence of British Malaya Overseas Chinese to the entire
overseas Chinese community was attached. After that, the Japanese government and
military inherited this policy. On February 14, 1942, the new " Outline of measures
toward overseas Chinese" was enacted, and the old "Outline of measures toward
overseas Chinese" from June 1941 was therefore abolished.156
The basic policy of the new Outline of measures toward overseas Chinese 
¨áj is to "let the overseas Chinese left from the Chiang regime, and to
complete the Great East Asia War so that the overseas Chinese can actively coordinate
with Japan.” In 1942, with the expansion of the Pacific War, Japan changed its priority
goal from “building of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” to “the completion
of the Great East Asian War.” Moreover, for the new goal, the principles of Chinese
overseas policy have also changed from seeking cooperation and coordination of
overseas Chinese to achieve the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," to the
"completion of the Great East Asian War." To achieve the objectives above, Japan has
comprehensively introduced the guidelines of "cooperation and coherence" in its
overseas Chinese work.
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The new guidelines of the Outline of measures toward overseas Chinese ¨
áj are listed as follows:157
1. Overseas Chinese countermeasures
2. The primary goal of the imperial administration in the occupied territories was
"submission" and "coherence" of the overseas Chinese. Under the guidance of
Japan, to maintain the connections between the overseas Chinese and the
Chinese mainland in the anti-Chiang movements, while blocked the other
political connections between overseas Chinese and China.
3. Under Japan's guidance, implement the Chinese overseas policy through the
local governments in French Indochina and Thailand.
4. Under the leadership of the empire, the Chinese overseas policy of the Nanjing
National Government was limited in the French Indochina and Thailand only,
while its primary goal was to maintain the necessary economic connections
related the people's livelihood (with the overseas Chinese societies there).
Japan, provide guidance when necessary, to the Nanjing National Government
on political, propaganda and other aspects of the overseas Chinese policy.
5. The overseas Chinese work carried out in China must be implemented as
outlined in the preceding paragraphs.
6. Overseas Chinese work’s guidance was responsible by
I

In the occupied territories (Southern A region), overseas Chinese work
was responsible by the army and navy.

II

In French Indochina and Thailand (Southern B region), it was
according to the agreement between the army and the navy, and was
responsible by the appointed foreign affairs officials, while cooperating
by the relevant agencies.

III The guidance of the overseas Chinese work carried out by the Nanjing
National Government in China, was responsible by the Japanese
Embassy in Nanjing and the local institutions of the East Asia
Development Board while maintaining close communication with the
Nanjing Embassy.
“Remarks”
1. Not only based on this outline, but Overseas Chinese policy (in the occupied
157
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territories) should also follow the principles in the “Outline on the management
of rights and interests of third countries consequent on implementing military
administration in occupied territories°1k`a7

v

j.”158
2. To abolish the old relevant institutions and guidelines of the Outline of
measures toward overseas Chinese.
At this point, the Chinese overseas policy regards “Nanyo (Southeast Asia),”
where the residency of overseas Chinese, as the focus. Japan, therefore aimed at the
control of overseas Chinese and ensure the critical national defense material as the
focus of its overseas Chinese policy. At this time, has the main purpose of obtaining
materials, what indispensable for Japan, was the cooperation of overseas Chinese.
Therefore, through “necessary pressure,” on the overseas Chinese, Japan expected the
overseas Chinese would be “coherence and cooperate” with them, which Japan could
be able to use the existing strength of overseas Chinese regarding economic influence
and capital. At the moment, Japan’s overseas Chinese policy emphasizes the active
cooperation of overseas Chinese.
For the occupation territories, first of all, the above document emphasized the
"submission" and "coherence" of the overseas Chinese under Japanese military
administration, and to maintain the economic relationship between the overseas
Chinese and China under the guidance of Japan. On the other hand, Japan attempted
to block the political relationship between the overseas Chinese and China. Also, the
role of the Nanjing National Government in the overseas Chinese policy is limited to
France and India and Thailand, but only the necessary people's livelihood and
economic ties have been exerted, and political and political propaganda is limited to
"necessary occasions." It may because, in the occupied territories that directly control
by the Japanese troops, Japan could directly rule the overseas Chinese there and
implement harsh policy there, and therefore do not need Nanjing National Government
to get involved. As a result, the overseas Chinese work of the Nanjing National
Government was limited to the French Indochina and Thailand, and was also limited
to "necessary economic connection for people's livelihood."159
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Moreover, about the implementation of overseas Chinese work, it was
responsible by very different guiding agencies in the occupied territories (A region)
and French Indochina, Thailand (B region). On the one hand, in the occupied territories
(A region), overseas Chinese work was guided by the corresponding army and navy,
while in French Indochina and Thailand (B region), Japan government have to
considerate about respecting the sovereignty of the French Indochina and the Thai
government. As a result, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was added, to get involved
and implement the overseas Chinese work together with the army and the navy
ministries, based on the agreements. In addition, the overseas Chinese policy of the
Nanjing National Government is not implemented by the Nanjing National
Government itself, but must be under the "guidance" of Japan, the right of direct for
the overseas Chinese policy of the Nanjing National Government, was controlled by
the Nanjing Embassy and the East Asia Development Board of Japan. To expand the
occupied territories in Southeast Asia, Japan paid high attention to the overseas
Chinese policy in China and other territories occupied by the army and the navy. For
this reason, in addition to the French Indochina and Thailand in the (B) region, the role
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Nanjing National Government has become
lower, instead, the Japanese government expected the army, the navy and the East Asia
Development Board could play significant roles in the overseas Chinese work.
In the "Remarks" of the "Outline of measures toward overseas Chinese ",
mentionedfor the overseas Chinese in the occupied territories, "Overseas Chinese
policy (in the occupied territories) is not only based on this outline, but also based on
the Outline on management of rights and interests of 3rd countries consequent on
implementing military administration in occupied territories°1k`a7


vj”. 160 The above document was formulated by the Liaison

Conference of Imperial Headquarters and Government on January 20, 1942, a month
before the establishment of the " Outline of measures toward overseas Chinese," which
was a summary of how to deal with the relationship between “third-country officials”
and “third-country nationals.” Among the key items, there are definitions of "(the socalled) third countries are allies, anti-communist parties, and other neutral

160

Drafted decision of Liaison Conference, Outline of measures toward overseas Chinese,
1942.02.14.
56

countries," 161 and "third-country nationals are third-country nationals and include
protected people."162 Based on this, between the Outline of measures toward overseas
Chinese and the Outline of Dealing with the Rights of Third Countries Accompanied
by the Occupation of Military and Political Affairs, to officially recognize the Nanjing
National Government, Japan interpreted overseas Chinese as the third-country national.
However, in the Outline of Dealing with the Rights of Third Countries Accompanied
by the Occupation of Military and Political Affairs, it mentioned, "(Who engaged in)
the destruction of resources and facilities, its rights would not be recognized as a thirdcountry national."163 In other words, to the hostile behavior against Japan (such as the
anti-Japanese activities of overseas Chinese), the Japanese army would deny
participants' rights as third-country nationals.
While war turned intensified in 1943, the Japanese government did not
announce its official overseas Chinese policy but still responded with the 1942 Outline
of measures toward overseas Chinese ¨«j. However, the 10th Committee
of the Investigative Committee of the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association `½
Á," which the then Prime Minister of the Cabinet, Tojo Hideki was the president,
proposed an investigation report to the Japanese government on May 10, 1943. The
investigation report titled Submitting to higher officials reports compiled by
Investigation Board titled “Actualization of Basic Measures for Constructing Greater
East Asia, Matters Requiring Cooperation of Races in Sphere and Measures to Secure
Their Cooperation (Southern Areas B),” “Countermeasures for Overseas Chinese”
and “Countermeasures for Muslims.” 164165 The investigation report included the
“Countermeasures for Overseas Chinese”¨s.
In the context of the conversion of Japan's policy to Southeast Asia, the 10th
Committee of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association divided Southeast Asia into
three regions, the first is the "direct jurisdiction territories", the second is the French
161
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Indochina, and the third is the "independent territory where will under the direct
jurisdiction of Japan in the future". On top of this, for the status of overseas Chinese,
the association advocated that the overseas Chinese should be treated differently
according to the various local conditions.
The 10th Committee of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association mentioned,
in the direct jurisdiction territories of Japan, "(based on their number and influence) It
is necessary (for Japan) to establish an entry ban on overseas Chinese, to restrict on
the number of them, or even prohibit entry." However, on the other hand, "In areas
where are sufficient with resources but insufficient in labor, rewards can be given to
the entry overseas Chinese. However, to adjust labor and consider mutual interests,
Taiwanese workers and overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are preferred".166 Also, to
give the overseas Chinese a status of Japanese nationality under certain conditions, the
registration system was considered to be introduced. However, in the granting of such
status, the report has set up many differences between overseas Chinese and Taiwanese
and Koreans, which planned to increase the status of overseas Chinese gradually. Also,
in the "independent territory where will under the direct jurisdiction of Japan in the
future," based on the spirit of "National Concord," and in response to the hopes of the
overseas Chinese, the policy of enrolling overseas Chinese into Japanese nationality
was established in the report. Such national treatment is for the collaborators of the
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."
In contrast, for the non-cooperators, to take the “conclusive (harsh) treatment” was
mentioned in the report.167
To Japan, the remittances-material exchanges relationship between overseas
Chinese and their origins (hometown) was one of its focus. According to the 10th
Committee of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the origin of overseas Chinese
is mostly in Southern China, especially in Guangdong Province and Fujian Province,
the overseas Chinese population originated there was unusually significant. The two
provinces were under Japanese occupation at the time of 1938. For this reason, in the
origin of overseas Chinese (hometown), if the local Chinese can understand (identify)
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the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, it may make their relatives,
overseas Chinese willing to cooperate with Japan. For this purpose, the above
measures implemented, and further proactively negotiated with the “(Nanjing)
National Government” to permit overseas Chinese to remit money to their families in
China, allowing them to maintain their livelihood.
In this way, considering the relationship between the Chinese overseas policy
and the Nanjing National Government, Japan’s close ties with the Nanjing National
Government are necessary to facilitate the cooperation of overseas Chinese, especially
in the independent regions and the direct jurisdiction territories in future. To protect
the economic interests of overseas Chinese and promote smooth communication with
overseas Chinese, Japan has set up consulates and business officials for the Nanjing
National Government. However, it pointed out that there is not necessary to set up
political and ideological institutions to control the overseas Chinese.
The relationship between Japan and the Nanjing National Government is also
related to Japan’s overseas Chinese policy. Based on the fundamental principles of the
Japanese overseas Chinese policy, Japan provided substantial support to the overseas
Chinese policy of the Nanjing National Government without contradicting the interests
of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Japan). In other words, Japan’s
overseas Chinese policy and its policy toward the Nanjing National Government are
mutually interacted policies and was not Japan’s separate actions, so the cooperation
of the Nanjing National Government is indispensable. It can be regarded as the role of
the Nanjing National Government in overseas Chinese work has been highly reevaluated and expected by Japan, after it declared war on America and Britain in
January 1943.

Chapter 3 Summary
This chapter examines the changes in Japan’s overseas Chinese policy from
the start of the Sino-Japanese War to the start of the Pacific War. In the early days of
the Sino-Japanese War, Japan viewed the issue of overseas Chinese from an economic
point of view and attempted to solve the overseas Chinese boycott movements on
Japanese goods. However, after the Japanese learned that the support of the overseas
Chinese was an essential factor in maintaining the Chongqing National Government’s
anti-Japanese policy, the focus of Japan’s policy on overseas Chinese shifted to the
cutting of overseas Chinese and the Chongqing National Government. In 1938, Japan
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and Japan occupied the two provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. The two provinces
are the hometowns of most overseas Chinese. Following that, for the purpose of
obtaining support from the overseas Chinese, Japan organized the organizations that
ruled overseas Chinese policies and organized liaison meetings on overseas Chinese
policy in the Central agencies such as the Army, Navy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Finance, to discuss the case, agreement, and implementation of the
overseas Chinese policy.
After Sino-Japanese War began, Japan’s overseas Chinese policy has shifted
to induce overseas Chinese to betray the Chongqing National Government, induce and
obtain support and cooperation for overseas Chinese, and build a co-prosperity circle
in Greater East Asia. Secondly, to ensure the assistance of overseas Chinese, the
Nanjing National Government launched it is overseas Chinese policy and made
attempts in fields such as diplomacy, economy, politics, and propaganda.
After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese military directly occupied
Southeast Asia. To respond to this situation, Japan has abolished its previous overseas
Chinese policy guidelines, and in 1942 it established a new Outlines of measures
towards overseas Chinese  ¨ «  j  . The outline of the above document
corresponds to the expansion of the scale of war, the cutting of overseas Chinese and
Chongqing government, and the mobilization of overseas Chinese to complete the
Great East Asia War. Also, the Nanjing National Government’s role in the outline of
the Chinese overseas policy is limited to the French Indochina and Thailand, and the
Army and the East Asia Development Board ¸K{ took charge in other occupied
territories. Not only the central government (Imperial General Headquarters#¶)
but also the Japanese troops in various places will also formulate overseas Chinese
policies in response to the local situation.
In the beginning, Japan regarded the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia
supporting the Chongqing Nationalist Government as an obstacle to the "resolving" of
the Sino-Japanese war and realized the importance of cutting the connection between
the overseas Chinese from the Chongqing National Government. Therefore, although
the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere incorporated the overseas
Chinese as “collaborator” in 1940, in the conception of the Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere, after the outbreak of the Pacific War, Japan’s policy on overseas
Chinese shifted from ensuring overseas Chinese's cooperation to the suppression of
overseas Chinese under Japan's military governance.
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4. JAPAN’S FRENCH INDOCHINA OVERSEAS CHINESE POLICY
This chapter aims to discuss Japan’s overseas Chinese policy in French Indochina
from 1940 to 1945 and its transition, with the differences between Japan’s overseas
Chinese policy in Southeast Asia and French Indochina in this stage. Through the
compare and analysis, to emphases the characteristics of Japan’s policy toward the
overseas Chinese in French Indochina.

The Formation of Japan-France Joint Domination system
In 1940, Japanese troops intrusion in the northern French Indochina. In July 1941,
it further intrusion in Southern French Indochina. In the 4 and half year from
September 1940 to March 1945, Japan dominated French Indochina with the French
Indochina government, which was under its military threat. The Japan-France, Joint
Domination system, was very different from the other Southeast Asian region. Japan
did not implement military governance there, instead, preserved the existing colonial
institutions in French Indochina.
The establishment of the above joint system has the reasons below:
First of all, the cooperation between the French Indochina government with Japan
was considered for maintaining the sovereignty of France in French Indochina. Since
France was already defeated and occupied by the Germans at the time, and its allies
were focusing in the Europe battlefield, it was hard for French Indochina government
to resist Japan’s invasion with its own. Instead, to cooperate with the Japanese and get
utilized by them, at least France can maintain the sovereignty in French Indochina in
the name. 168
On the other hand, to Japan, the reason for it preserves the French colonial
institutions in French Indochina, was because it could have utilized the existing system
to get access to the crucial resources it needs in French Indochina in the fastest and
most stable way.169
Under the Japan-France Joint Domination system, the action of Japan in French
Indochina was limited by various agreements. It bound Japan from freely propose its
measures in political, military and economic aspects.
The “Matsuoka-Henry Agreement” signed on 30th August 1940 was one of the
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essential agreement. This agreement regulated that French government recognized
Japan’s supreme interest politically and economically in the Far East, and on the other
hand, Japan has to respect French right and interest in the Far East, especially
Indochina’s territorial completeness and France’s sovereignty on the Federations of
Indochina.170 This agreement restricted Japan to consider the existence and respond of
the French Indochina government whenever it takes any actions, and could not violate
the sovereignty and interest of the French Indochina government. In contrast, the
French Indochina government could not violate Japan’s political and economic interest.
As a result, this agreement had brought dilemma in the balance of interests and rights
between the two countries of Japan and France (French Indochina government). The
issue of overseas Chinese has also become complicated due to the provisions of this
agreement.
In the Promulgating protocol between Japan and France on the joint defense of
French Indo-China °-_C,.D¶ #
ÇHr



" publicized on 29th July 1941, in the preference of the protocol, Japan

claimed to respect the territorial completeness of French Indochina and its sovereignty.
In contrast, in the protocol, French Indochina government promised that not to against
Japan directly or indirectly, in any possible political, economic and military aspects.
Also, French Indochina government promised that not to have a connection with the
third country.171
Base on the principles above, in the context of the protocol, three regulations were
made:
First, Japan and French (French Indochina) government would cooperate with each
other on the military aspect, for the common defense of French Indochina.
Second, arrangement for the above cooperation
Third, only if the applicable situation exists, the above regulations were adequate.
Also, in the Exchange of official documents concerning military cooperation kE
F



*    172 signed on the same day, French Indochina

government recognized the freedom of action of Japanese stationary troops within
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French Indochina. Also, it mentioned that, as long as it does not infringe on France’s
sovereignty over French Indochina, the Japanese troops can freely use the entire
French Indochina.173

Japan’s French Indochina’s Overseas Chinese Policy and Its Changes
Previous section deals with the establishment process and the basic
structure of the Japanese-French common control system. The purpose of this section
is to examine how Japan, under the joint governance of Japan and France, how Japan
formulate and implement its French Indochina policy as it was aware of the importance
of the French Indochina.
Japan, where the war in mainland China has fallen into a quagmire and turned
to a policy of southwards, has begun to consider ensuring that people and resources in
Southeast Asia are important issues. To this end, the assistance of overseas Chinese
who have considerable political and economic influence in the French Indochina and
even the Southeast Asian region is the most important. The overseas Chinese also
occupy an essential position in the concept of building a large East Asian co-prosperity
circle. At the same time, the overseas Chinese’s gold transfer to China is an
indispensable source of funds for the Chongqing National Government and an
important task to support China’s war against Japan. Therefore, Japan has to pay
attention to overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.
In order to understand the political and economic power of the overseas
Chinese in the 1930s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the East Asian Economic Survey
Bureau of the Manchuria, the Governor’s Office of Taiwan, the Planning Institute, and
Taiwan’s Colonization Co., Ltd. have conducted a large number of investigations and
field investigations. Research survey. According to these investigation reports, at that
time, the French Indochina overseas Chinese played a crucial role in the French
Indochina economy and had full control over the French Indochina economy,
especially the rice-rice distribution institutions and trade institutions in the fine rice
industry. Both the Chinese and French Indochina have an exclusive status here. Rice
is an essential resource for Japan to ensure that the French Indochinese is under its
control. As for the guarantee of the rice, the movement of the French Indochina
overseas and the attitude towards Japan have become a vital existence. In cooperation
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with the French Indochina authorities, the goal is to obtain food supplies militarily and
to use the Indochina to settle in for economic purposes and to block the “Chiang's Aid
Route" to resolve the Sino-Japanese war as soon as possible. At the same time, how to
acquire and absorb the French Indochina overseas is one of the keys to its broad
strategy.
Among the official documents of Japan, French Indochina overseas Chinese
was firstly mentioned in the cabinet decision of September 3, 1940, titled "The Policy
for the development of the French Indochina Economy «8-¤ºo,f,a
.174 This decision is related to the policy guidelines for the overseas Chinese in
Indochina; it pointed out Japan should demand the French Indochina government
severely banned the anti-Japanese activities of overseas Chinese, while it has to utilize
overseas Chinese’s economic status, capital, and organizations for its great plan.175
Compared with the aforementioned "Southern Economic Policy Guidelines," "The
Policy for the development of the French Indochina Economy " shows a clear direction
of overseas Chinese work.
In political aspect, it pointed out the measures of strictly banning the antiJapanese activities with them to aid Chiang Kai-shek of overseas Chinese, through
communication with the French Indochina government.
In the economic aspect, it aimed at the construction of the Great East Asia CoProsperity Sphere, considering to use the economic status of overseas Chinese with
their economic influence and organizations. "Requesting the French Indochina
government to be severely banned" indicated the fact that Japan had to show its respect
for France's sovereignty over French Indochina. About the use of the economic power
of overseas Chinese, the "power of overseas Chinese, especially its economic strength,
can assist the new government and promote economic construction."
After entering 1941, The Japan-Soviet non-aggression treaty concluded on
April 13, and the war between Germany and the Soviet Union broke out on June 22.
The Chinese overseas policy, therefore, encountered a big turn. Japan, which formed
a three-nation alliance with Germany and Italy, responded to the outbreak of the
German-Soviet war and sought a new national policy in the pre-war meeting. The army
and the navy were divided into two factions at this time: one was the army’s northward
174
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faction, see the Soviet Union as an imaginary enemy, carried out military operations
against it, and assisted Germany in pinning the Soviet Union; the second was the
navy’s southward faction, who wanted to expand to Southeast Asia to obtain the
critical resources, at the expense of entering war with the United States and Britain. In
response to the conflicts between the two factions, in June 1941, the "National Policy
Plan for the South" jointly formulated by the Army and the Navy decided the decision
of forcibly march the army to Thailand and the southern French Indochina.
The Headquarter of the Indochina Expedition Army of Japan had made the
Policy on the overseas Chinese work in French Indochina 8-¨:+Â&2
, and the Overseas Chinese policy in French Indochina 8-¨:s before the
intrusion of Japanese troops in the southern French Indochina. In the documents, the
importance and the principles of the overseas Chinese work were stated clearly.
At the beginning of the “Policy on the overseas Chinese work in French
Indochina 8-¨:+Â&2, which decided in 26th June, 1941, it pointed
out that the purpose of the intrusion of Japanese troops in the southern French
Indochina, was to establish the complete leadership of Japan in French Indochina, to
strengthen the overseas Chinese work there, as part of the self-sufficient sphere.176 By
gaining the support of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia (through overseas
Chinese work), aims to blockade the Chiang aid route”, which explained the
importance and influence of the intrusion of troops in southern French Indochina to
the overall overseas Chinese work. After that, it stated that “The meaning of the
Southern policy of the empire is differed from the “Southward policy” in the past,
which is part of the construction of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in the
Asian Revival policy, which is essential as the solution of the Sino-Japanese War. It
was also “justified” by the idea of the “national demand” of Japan, which like "If our
empire wants the development of the nation, we must develop the resources of the
southern regions, and cooperate with the Southeast Asians to complete the civilized
cultural work with the coexistence and common prosperity."177
In the “Policy on the overseas Chinese work in French Indochina 8-¨
:+Â&2, it stated that for solving the Sino-Japanese War, the “aggressive
measure” have to be implemented. The “aggressive measure” was, the work to exclude
176
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the reason of aiding to Chiang Kai-shek and gaining support from the Chinese. The
“Chinese” mentioned above, included the overseas Chinese. It clearly stated that “the
overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia, bear the economics of the Chiang regime, was an
important target of our work. Such overseas Chinese completely monopolized the
Rationing institutes (of resources), and their nationalism in politics is awakening, who
launched the boycotting movements on Japanese goods, with anti-Japanese
fundraising, and volunteering, seriously slows down our(Japan’s) process to solve the
China Incident (Sino-Japanese War). Thence, the overseas Chinese work focusing on
excluding their resistance is highly related to the strength of our nation(Japan).”178 It
stated the significant economic role of the overseas Chinese, in aiding China and
launching the anti-Japanese movements, which also pointed out the importance of
overseas Chinese work and its relation with solving the Sino-Japanese War. In the
“policy,” although the importance of overseas Chinese work had been realized,
however, overseas Chinese in French Indochina was considered as a part of the whole
Southeast Asia overseas Chinese, rather as an individual problem. "It must confirm the
current situation of the overseas Chinese before specific policymaking, and the policy
has to make base on reality."179 It expressed Japan’s cautious attitude and based on the
reality in the policymaking of the Chinese overseas policy.
In this regard, the Policy on the overseas Chinese work in French Indochina
also describes the specific policy for French Indochina and French Indochina overseas
Chinese. The characteristics of the French Indochina overseas Chinese are described
in the policy as "French Indochina was geographically connected with the mainland
for more than a thousand miles. Owing to its adjacent to the Southwest China, its
culture, economic attachment with China were inseparable. Thence, French Indochina
overseas Chinese were different from the overseas Chinese of other parts of Southeast
Asia. The specialty of French Indochina overseas Chinese, was not in its population,
but in its quality.”180
It points out that, unlike other Southeast Asian regions, French Indochina is
geographically connected with China, and it is intimately connected with China in
cultural and economic relations. Therefore, even though the scale of the overseas
Chinese population in Indochina is much less significant than that of other parts of
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Southeast Asia, however, their hegemony there never came from their number, rather
than their economic status. In other words, because the French Indochina being close
to the Chinese border, and affected by the Chinese anti-Japanese war, it is expected
that there will be an intense wave of anti-Japanese movements. Before that, the
document pointed out that Japan should have necessary understand and prepare for the
coming situation.181
The political trend of the overseas Chinese in French Indochina was entirely
different in the north and the south of French Indochina.182 According to the report of
the Indochina Expedition Army of Japan, after the Japanese troop's intrusion in
northern French Indochina, the overseas Chinese there had turned from anti-Japanese
to cooperate with Japan, due to the consideration of self-interest. On the other hand,
the overseas Chinese in southern French Indochina stayed anti-Japan attitude since the
influence of Japan had not yet reached Cochin-china, the center of the overseas
Chinese population in local. For utilized overseas Chinese’s economic strength and
capital, French Indochina government remained to cooperate with the Chongqing
National Government for keeping its control on overseas Chinese there.
In particular, the French Indochina Dispatch Command, which controls the
southern French Indochina through the southern French Indochina, believes that it is
not only necessary to grasp the overseas Chinese Indochina, but also politically all the
overseas Chinese, especially Singapore. The intention of the overseas Chinese to
induce into our camp is that this is a significant opportunity for the South Advance
Policy and at the same time interrupting the overseas Chinese’s aid to Chiang Kaishek and the best way to deal with the incident. At this point, it emphasizes the strategic
importance of French Indochina in the issue of overseas Chinese including Southeast
Asia.
In the Overseas Chinese policy in French Indochina 8-¨:s, which
decided in 27th June 1941, it stated at the front, the overseas Chinese work in French
Indochina was related to gaining the support from the resident there, which can “cut
off the materialistic, spiritual relation between the Chongqing regime and the overseas
Chinese, to turn them for my (Japan’s) usage, as the solution of the China Incident
(Sino-Japanese War).” Moreover, in the “Overseas Chinese policy in French
Indochina,” besides the analysis on the features of the French Indochina overseas
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Chinese society, it also suggested the policy on political and economic aspects.
Politically, it suggested that since the French Indochina overseas Chinese
population was mostly originated from Fujian and Guangdong, after the Japanese
troops occupied the two provinces, the Headquarter of the Indochina Expedition Army
ordered to protect the tombs of the overseas Chinese, with the measures to stabilize
the hometown of the overseas Chinese, for the purpose of calm down the hostility of
the overseas Chinese towards Japan. It was also for the future possible cooperation.
The focus of the overseas Chinese work in this document was mainly for countering
the propaganda work of the Chongqing National Government. Besides, as same as the
Outline of measures toward overseas Chinese ¨áj decided in July 1941,
the “Overseas Chinese policy in French Indochina” also paid attention to the economic
work.183
"The military occupation of the origin of overseas Chinese, the politically
absorbing the outstanding elements of overseas Chinese, depends on the use of
the policy. The overseas Chinese have the same name as the "Jews of the
Pacific," like their name, rich in money, and "profit" They can be used. It is the
existence of the “Jinlanpu (Chinese traditional brotherhoods)” between
overseas Chinese, and it is also a secret means of combining business and
finance to expand their respective interests."184
The above-mentioned "Jinlanpu System" supported the unity of overseas
Chinese societies and played a role in ensuring financial credit among the overseas
Chinese. In order to allow Japanese goods to enter the French Indochina market, Japan
attempted to use the "money desire" of the overseas Chinese, to directly trade with the
overseas Chinese, by giving them interest, and to finally cut off the material and
spiritual connection between the French Indochina overseas Chinese and the
Chongqing National Government.185
On 10th July 1941, the official conference of the overseas Chinese-related
organs, Outlines of measures towards overseas Chinese ¨«j was proposed.
There were 2 principles in the “Outlines”, which were (1) to guide the overseas
Chinese in Southeast Asia to abandon Chiang and to stop the aid, in order to solve the
183
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“China Incident (Sino-Japanese War)”, and (2) guide the overseas Chinese to assist
the establishment of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.186 Moreover, about
French Indochina, the document stated that “the critical region of the overseas Chinese
work, focus on the overseas Chinese of French Indochina and Thailand. Using two
countries as the base, to strengthen the overseas Chinese work in another region
gradually, according to the expansion of imperial power.” Which means that French
Indochina and Thailand were the priority of Japan’s overseas Chinese policy, and base
on the overseas Chinese work there, to further expand the overseas Chinese work in
other regions. The reason behind probably because in the time of July 1941, in
Southeast Asia, only French Indochina and Thailand were under its influence.
Other reason why French Indochina and Thailand were selected as the critical
region of Japan’s overseas Chinese policy, might because of the following two reasons.
First, at the time, to French Indochina, what Japan concern the most was to
blockade the “Chiang aid route.” At the same time, Japan had understood the
significant strategic importance geo-politically, as the bridgehead of Japan expansion
in Southeast Asia, which able it to access the precious resources in Dutch East Indies
and British Malaya, which the Strait settlements were even an essential strategic point
for Japan in the war plan.187188
Second, from July 1939, the rice supply of Japanese was severely insufficient.
To ensure the rice supply from French Indochina and Thailand, to obtain enough food
for the consumer of its people and the supply of the troops back then became Japan’s
priority. Japan expected the rice productivity in the high regions, to fulfill its civil and
military needs.189
For the above two situations, the role of the French Indochina overseas Chinese
is significant. The French Indochina overseas Chinese not only monopolized the rice
distribution institution of the French Indochina but also played a central role in the
trade between the French Indochina and the Southeast Asian regions. Also, most of
the rice exported by the French Indochina to Southeast Asia is exported through
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overseas Chinese to Hong Kong and Shanghai. In addition to rice, there is also the
output of coal, rubber, cotton produce in and export from there. In contrast, French
Indochina import the commodity groceries from Hong Kong, the Dutch East Indies,
and the British Malaya through the overseas Chinese.
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, overseas Chines in French
Indochina launched the anti-Japanese fundraising, with the General Embassy started
its anti-Japanese propaganda, trying to integrate overseas Chinese support by
promising economic interest.
Compared with the overseas Chinese work of Japan, the overseas Chinese
work of Chongqing National Government was not significant. Which may because of
its importance was relatively smaller to the war in China. In contrast, Japan’s overseas
Chinese work encountered with the Chongqing government, was quite aggressive and
active, in gaining the support of overseas Chinese.
Right after the Pacific War outbreak, in preparation for the needs of the war,
the Liaison Conference of related organs190 decided the new “Outline of measures
toward overseas Chinese” in 14th December 1942, with abolishing its overseas Chinese
policy in the past.
The principles of “Outline of measures toward overseas Chinese” of 1942, was
to attract the overseas Chinese to cooperate with Japan, give up the Chongqing
government, as the assistance force of solving the “Great East Asia War.”
The objectives in it were:191
1. Establishment of overseas Chinese in different regions, based on the reality of the
local overseas Chinese societies.
2. Implement the overseas Chinese work under the Japanese Army, for the obtaining
of the “national defense essential material.”
3. Take necessary political pressure on overseas Chinese, to lead them to sympathize
with Japan.
4. Use the existing economic functions and habits of the overseas Chinese, and guide
the overseas Chinese to assist Japan’s policy
5. Gradually control the overseas Chinese society as the situation changes
The “Outline of measures toward overseas Chinese” of 1942, the role of
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Nanjing National Government in overseas Chinese work was limited in French
Indochina and Thailand only. It emphasized that the cooperation of overseas Chinese
was essential to achieve the goal of establishing the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. Moreover, differ from the other occupied regions, Japan established the
principles of respecting the sovereignty and territorial completeness, thence led
Japan’s action taking on overseas Chinese became difficult. As a result, Japan has to
implement its overseas Chinese policy through the colonial regime in French
Indochina. It means that Japan’s overseas Chinese policy in French Indochina was not
through Japan, but through French Indochina government, according to the request
and guidance of French Indochina.
The overseas Chinese in French Indochina had domination power in the local
economy, especially in the rice industry, rice distribution agencies and rice trading
institutes. French Indochina, as the first target in Japan’s expansion in Southeast Asia,
was the crucial region in the overseas Chinese policy of Japan. The overseas Chinese
policy in French Indochina of Japan basically followed the main body of the board
overseas Chinese policy of Japan. However, since Japan’s policy and form of
governance in French Indochina (region B) were different from the other Southeast
Asian regions (region A), overseas Chinese policy in French Indochina of Japan
contained its specialty. The policymaking, guidance, and implementation of Japans’
French Indochina overseas Chinese policy were based on the cooperation between the
Navy, the Army and the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, as a critical diplomatic,
economic policy of Japan in the entire plan of wartime. The implementation of
overseas Chinese policy in French Indochina was the indirect work through the French
Indochina government in reality.

Chapter 4 Summary
In this Chapter, the importance of Japan’s Overseas Chinese policies in French
Indochina within Japan’s Overseas Chinese policies was discussed and analyzed. It
also analyzed various of measures on Overseas Chinese proposed and written by the
Japanese Army. It could be observed that the different region occupied by the Japanese
Army implied different overseas Chinese policies according to the local situation there.
However, limited by the sources, only two documents written by the Japanese
Expedition Army of French Indochina and 1 document written by the 25th Army of
Japan, which occupied British Malaya was found.
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1. Japan’s overseas Chinese policies in French Indochina has mainly followed
the same objectives as Japan's policies on overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Both of
them are aimed at early settlement of the Sino-Japanese War, cutting the relationship
between overseas Chinese and the Chongqing National Government, and making the
overseas Chinese cooperate and invest in the construction of the Great East Asia Coprosperity. However, French Indochina and Thailand were the bridgeheads of the
entire Southeast Asian overseas policy of Japan. They were also the first step of
Japan’s expansion in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the Headquarters of Indochina
Expeditionary Army has the authority to formulate the overseas Chinese policies in
their own right according to the reality of overseas Chinese society in French
Indochina (see Outline of measures toward overseas Chinese ¨«j in July
1941).
2.

According to the above objectives, Japan’s overseas Chinese policies in

French Indochina could be divided into economic, political and propaganda aspects.
The direction of the three aspects was as same as the overseas Chinese policies of
Japan in other Southeast Asian regions. However, Japan’s overseas Chinese policy in
French Indochina was more special than other Southeast Asian regions. Owing to the
protocol signed with French Indochina, Japan has to respect France’s sovereignty in
French Indochina. Direct military suppression on overseas Chinese therefore become
difficult for Japan Army. All kinds of support to the pro-Japan overseas Chinese
associations along with the propaganda work must also obtain the permission from the
French Indochinese government. Even transactions with overseas Chinese have to
consider the existence of the French Indochinese authorities. In other words, apart
from the military operations, there is not much room for Japan to carry out its overseas
Chinese work in political, economic, and cultural aspects. For example, when Japan's
overseas Chinese policy was unfolded, it is necessary to consider the existence of the
French Indochina regime. The implementation process of the overseas Chinese policy
is an indirect move through the French Indochinese government.
3. "Preservation of Peace in French Indochina.”192 The guidance agencies for
overseas Chinese work in French Indochina was undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, according to the agreement of the Army and Navy of Japan. The
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overseas Chinese policy of Japan had given a prominent position to the Nanking
Nationalist Government, however, did not receive the recognition from France, nor
French Indochinese government. The law of French Indochina did not recognize
Nanking Nationalist Government.193
4.

Compared with Malaya and Singapore, where there were radical anti-

Japanese movements, Japan's policies of the overseas Chinese in French Indochina
were quite different. Japan’s overseas Chinese policies in Malaya and Singapore have
specific instructions on the use of force towards the overseas Chinese. In contrast,
Japan's overseas Chinese policies in French Indochina have not paid much attention to
the exercise of force and have emphasized “cooperation” and “coherence.”
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5. THE REALITY OF JAPAN’S OVERSEAS POLICIES IN FRENCH
INDOCHINA
Changes and Economic Work of the French Indochina Rice-Paddy
Distribution Agency
French Indochina, especially Cochin-china, is the origin of rice. The collection
of rice and polished rice in this place are entirely in the hands of overseas Chinese.
The rice produced by the French Indochina is sold directly to the original rice merchant
by the agent of the overseas Chinese and then transported to the overseas Chinese
monopoly by the original rice merchant, at the rice-polishing factory in Cholon. The
economic strength of the French Indochina overseas Chinese, which is most
concentrated in the distribution organization of the rice, cannot be overstated.
Therefore, overseas Chinese are regarded as the most important key to solving the
problems of the French Indochina. Therefore, the policy of the French Indochina
overseas Chinese is most focused on economic work. At that time, it was necessary to
ensure that Japan, which was stationed in Japan and various regions, gave Japan a
considerable degree of attention to ensuring the supply of rice in the French Indochina
region. However, Japan’s policy of ensuring the supply of rice through the French
Indochina regime has strengthened the economic control of the French Indochina and
the increasing possibility of Japanese companies entering the French Indochina market,
in exchange for the dissatisfaction of the overseas Chinese; On the contrary, if the
French Indochina regime is directly connected to the overseas Chinese, it may incur a
strong counter-attack of the French Indochina regime.

The overseas Chinese work of Japan in French Indochina
The political basis for the relationship between Japan and the French Indochina
was based on the Matsuoka-Henry Agreement signed on 30th August 1940.194 The
Japanese army launched its overseas Chinese work while respecting France’s
sovereignty in French Indochina. At the same time, the Nanjing National Government
has also actively carried out work on overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. As same as
Japan's overseas Chinese policy, Nanjing regime's overseas Chinese work focused on
French Indochina. Therefore, the French Indochina is an area where Japan and the
Nanjing National Government together focus on the overseas Chinese work.
To the overseas Chinese of French Indochina, the Japanese army first adopted
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a peaceful strategy. In 1939, the Japanese Army acquired the "Zhongbei News" in the
northern French Indochina, and issued its Chinese version. Of the 12 French-language
news in French Indochina, four published pro-Japan news. Also, the Japanese army
distributed French and Vietnamese pamphlets of pro-Japan propaganda.195 However,
this strategy has only a direct impact on a small number of overseas Chinese living in
the northern part of French Indochina, because more than half of the French Indochina
overseas Chinese live in the southern part of the French Indochina, which was the
result of the failure. Therefore, Japan established two news agencies in Saigon, and
promoted the spirit of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere through the
organs mentioned above, and investigated the life of overseas Chinese, the news of
overseas Chinese, and the anti-Japanese propaganda.
However, until the time of 1942, the overseas Chinese newspaper in southern
Vietnam still maintain a strong influence in the region. From the report of 1942, there
was still 50 overseas Chinese newspaper in Southern Vietnam. Although under the
pressure of the French Indochina government, the newspapers avoid publicizing the
editorial and tended to report the news focusing on overseas Chinese. Still, the
overseas Chinese newspapers only publish the new from the Chongqing sides, as a
kind of propaganda to encourage the pro-Chongqing overseas Chinese.196 And among
them, some of the most influential newspapers were the “People’s Daily
(Minbao)”(1000 copies), which was the newspaper of Kuomintang; and the “Far East
Daily (Yuan Dong Ribao)”(3000), the newspaper of the General Chamber; the “China
Daily (Zhongguo Ribao)”(500) and “Chinese Daily (Zhonghua Ribao)”(500).197 The
editorial policies of the newspaper above were centered on the anti-Japanese news198.
In June 1941, the Chinese Nationalist Party of the Chongqing National
Government Department reported that the "People's Daily (Minbao)" issued the
threatening letters to the overseas Chinese who cooperated with Japan. On July 20, the
"People's Daily" refused to urge the Japanese special agents to announce support for
Japanese and Nanjing nationals Government. Therefore, on July 28, after the southern
French Indochina was "stationed," the French Indochina regime, due to Japan’s request,
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closed the "People’s Daily" and the Chamber of Commerce’s “Far East Daily.”199200
After December 1941, the French Indochina prohibited and banned the anti-Japanese
news, and the remaining overseas Chinese speech agencies in Vietnam were placed
under the administration of the Japanese and Nanjing National Governments. China’s
anti-Japanese intelligence cannot be spread openly among overseas Chinese.201
Also, to monitor the actions of the French Indochina overseas, the Japanese
Ambassador’s Office has set up an "Overseas Affairs Division." The Overseas Chinese
Affairs Division has the role of monitoring the movements of overseas Chinese and
collecting information on overseas Chinese. At the same time, Japan also occupied the
Vietnam Chinese Chamber of Commerce [<¼~as the base of the Japanese
Kenpeitai, which is responsible for reporting anti-Japanese overseas Chinese.
By the Matsuoka-Henry Agreement, Japan was restricted from directly
arresting the overseas Chinese. To expel the anti-Japanese groups from the French
Indochina and the anti-Japanese overseas Chinese who assisted the Chongqing
National Government, it is necessary to seek the cooperation of the French Indochina
government.202
After the Pacific War outbreak, Japan’s suppression of overseas Chinese was
further intensified. On the day of the war, the French Indochina regime ordered 22
Japanese cadres from various agencies of the Chongqing National government,
including the Blue Shirts Society and the Anti-Japanese Association, and forced the
remaining overseas Chinese to cooperate with Japan fully. Also, the Kenpeitai
(Military Police of the Japanese army) directly arrested the overseas Chinese, with
notifying the French Indochina government before the arresting. At that time, the First
Kenpeitai of the Southern Army set up its headquarters in Saigon. Kenpeitai also set
up some small teams in other towns.
In 26th September 1941, Kenpeitei arrested 50 overseas Chinese in Hanoi and
Haiphong. 203 In the 21 November 1941, after the diplomatic negotiation with the
French Indochina government, the Kenpeitei arrested 91 “anti-Japanese overseas
Chinese.” In April the following year, the “Radio Broadcasting of Chongqing” was
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uncovered in Haiphong. In July 1944, the “Spy network of China” was uncovered in
Hanoi and Haiphong. In September the same year, the “overseas Chinese spy network
of the Chongqing” was uncovered in Hanoi, and the arrested were tortured and
executed.204 From March to September 1944, 24 overseas Chinese were expelled from
Cochin-china by the French Indochina government because of anti-Japanese behaviors.
However, different from another region in Southeast Asia, the significant scale
of purges/massacre in Singapore, Malaya, and Indonesia was absent in French
Indochina. Still, in Hoi An, there were cases of overseas Chinese got arrested and
killed in 1943 and 1945.205
In December 1941, the Pacific War began, to implement overseas Chinese
work, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee dispatched Zhang Yongfu to Southeast
Asia.206 The reason for using Zhang Yongfu as a special commissioner is to induce the
overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia to cooperate to build a large East Asian coprosperity circle through its influence in Southeast Asia.
In 1942, the Nanjing National Government established the Lin Jia-min
organization in its office in Hanoi, took charge of providing the stagnation goods to
the Nanjing National Government, which were generated because the overseas
Chinese turned to support the Nanjing National Government instead of sending
materials to aid Chiang. At the same time, based on the instructions of the Nanjing
National Government, new Kuomintang branches were set up in Saigon, Hanoi, and
Haiphong, and carried out the registration of party members. The overseas Chinese
Overseas Defense Band in Haiphong was reorganized into a self-defense group
(Vigilante) under the supervision of the Japanese army.
According to the five items of political work in the "Outline of measures
toward overseas Chinese" set by Japan in July 1941, the overseas Chinese work of the
Nanjing National Government is mainly aimed at supporting Japan diplomatically.
The Japanese Army established the political foundation for the overseas Chinese work
activities of the Nanjing National Government and requested the French Indochina
authorities to accept the Nanjing National Government to set up a consulate in the local
area. At the same time, "the poster promoting the establishment of the new Chinese
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National Government, and various propaganda pamphlets that are beneficial to the
Wang Jingwei regime, were spread all over the owners of the Overseas Chinese
Association and the main stores of the Hanoi" which started the work of inducing
overseas Chinese for the Nanjing National Government.
By arresting the anti-Japanese overseas Chinese, exiled them through the
French Indochina authorities, Japan gradually formed a pro-Japanese attitude among
the French Indochina overseas Chinese. In the economy, the rice distribution
institutions, export institutions, and trade institutions of the French Indochina were all
in the hands of the overseas Chinese. Therefore, for Japan to ensure a stable supply of
goods led by rice, the cooperation between the French Indochina colonial regime and
the French Indochina overseas is of the utmost importance. In other words, Japan,
which wants to continue to receive the French Indochina rice, must also form a
partnership with the French Indochina government and the French Indochina overseas.

Propaganda work - centering on the popularity of Japanese language and film
work
To obtain military resources, a series of economic agreements, diplomatic
agreements and similar economic and political work are also essential. The acquisition
of the support of locals and overseas Chinese is indispensable for obtaining the military
resources. Therefore, the Japanese side also attaches great importance to the publicity
work aimed at securing the support of overseas Chinese.
In June 1938, the Propaganda Policy on Overseas Chinese «¨\z
decided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Cabinet Intelligence Department,
described the purpose of Japan's propaganda work for overseas Chinese: "Made
opportunities to let the overseas Chinese lost their trust in the Chiang regime and
merged (cooperate) with the new (Wang) regime." "Promoting the idea of reliance on
Japan, and turning to support the new (Wang) regime, is a means to defeat the Chiang
regime and is the driving force which can strengthen the new regime."207
Later, in 1941, Japan set up the Outline of measures toward overseas Chinese
¨«j in the French Indochina, mainly targeted on promoting "the advantages
of Axis side" and "Chongqing Regime's Internal Conflicts and Critics of Its Policies."
To achieve the above goals, Japan has adopted the "expansion of communication
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network," "use of news magazines," "Radio propaganda," "convince overseas
Chinese's inspection team to Japan and China" as measures.208
On February 19, 1942, the telecom no.151 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Tougo, Nakayama Minister reported on the propaganda guidelines and essentials of
the southern French Indochina. The propaganda policy described in this
telecommunication has the following seven items:209
1. "To complete the Great East Asian War, and to promote the military
strength of the Imperial Army (Japanese Army)"
2. “Completely implement the Agreement on the Joint Defense of Military
and Economic Relations between Japan and French Indochina.”
3. “Given the special status of Sai Kung in the Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere, propaganda goals limited to French Indochina only.”
4. "Special attention should be paid to the different levels of education of
French, overseas Chinese and ordinary people in the Indochina of France."
5. “Coordinating the French who reconciled (willing to cooperate) in the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”
6. “Our (Diplomatic) Ministry that is engaged in information and publicity
affairs have to obey the instructions of the headquarters of the ambassador.”
7. "Maintain close contact with other local army and naval reporting
departments, Federated News Agency . £  Y V

and other

departments."
The propaganda policy mentioned above promoted the spirit of the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and praising Japan while fiercely criticized the
European and American countries.
Unlike other Southeast Asian regions, Japan has shown its position and attitude to keep
the harmony with the French colonial government to avoid any possible friction with
the French regime of Indochina. Also, the propaganda work of the above is carried out
under the cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the cooperation of the
Army and the Navy and the Allied Communications Agency.
Under the Japanese-French joint dominance system, Japan, which ruled
Indochina with the French authorities, Japan did not have a separate cinema, nor had
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its radio station, however. It could only obtain the permission from the Saigon radio
station under the management of French Indochina for a specified period. For
publications, it is in a situation that has to be reviewed by the French Indochina regime.
In other words, Japan does not have the freedom to implement propaganda in the
French Indochina. Therefore, for Japan, Japanese language education and movies are
essential propaganda weapons, to counter the anti-Japanese propaganda of the United
States and Britain and the Chongqing National Government, and thus it was the
primary focus. Among Japan's propaganda of the French Indochina, the popularization
of Japanese language and film work are the main points.

The popularization of Japanese language
With the Japanese army intrusion in the French Indochina, the necessity of
Japanese language education, therefore increased. According to the "Taiwan New
Daily News" at the time, it was a fashion to learn Japanese in Vietnam. At that time,
the Japan International Tourism Bureau of Hanoi published a conversational book
containing Japanese, French, and simple spoken English, which was used by
businessmen who traveled to Vietnam for business purposes.210
According to the memories of Otaku Shouyoo of the Federated News Agency,
at the time when the Japanese troop's intrusion in the southern French Indochina in
July 1941, the Japanese language was "in no power" in Saigon. After 1942, due to the
necessity of cooperating with Japan in business, the Chinese businessmen of the
French Indochina, Vietnamese businesspeople, and Indian businessmen began to learn
Japanese. The French Indochina officials who are related to Japan affairs were required
to acquire Japanese language skill.211

Chapter 5 Summary
This chapter examines Japan's policy towards overseas Chinese in French
Indochina, to obtain overseas Chinese cooperation, from economics, politics and
publicity aspects.
In economic terms, to obtain essential resources headed by rice, Japan required a
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significant amount of rice supply from the French Indochina government based on the
Japan-France Economic Agreement. French Indochina government announced the
relevant laws and regulations related to the price of rice, rice transportation, brown
rice, rice holdings, to handle Japan's pressures and requirements.
As a result, in the rice market and rice distribution agencies in the French
Cochin-china, although the entrenched forces of overseas Chinese have not been
completely ruled out, the monitoring of the import and export of rice from France
Indochina has been a significant change. On the other hand, because Japan has retained
France's rule in Indochina, it has made it impossible to directly interfere in the control
of the rice distribution institutions in overseas Chinese.
Under this state, Japan exerted pressure on the French Indochinese authorities,
attracted pro-Japan overseas Chinese by economic interests, thus indirectly controlling
the rice market and rice distribution agencies.
Also, in the area of political work, after Japanese Army entered the northern
France Indochina, Japan used the French Indochina regime as an intermediary to ban
the overseas Chinese’s anti-Japanese movements and attempted to erase the antiJapanese attitude of those overseas Chinese. In July 1941, after the Japanese Army
entered the southern French Indochina, Japan itself started direct overseas Chinese
work, monitored and banned the anti-Japanese movements of the overseas Chinese.
Generally speaking, the French Indochina regime will go through the
association with Japan’s Army and Navy and the ambassador’s office, follow the
overseas Chinese policy decided by the Japanese government, and implement the
overseas Chinese work by the agreement of the three parties. Therefore, in the
implement of Japan's overseas Chinese work in French Indochina, when Japan arrested
the anti-Japanese overseas Chinese, the first report to the French Indochina authorities,
to express Japan's respect to French sovereignty in Indochina.
The next step is to analyze the contents of Japan's publicity work, including
Japan’s language work and film work in French Indochina during the Pacific War.
After the Japanese Army stationed in French Indochina, under the joint rule of Japan
and France, the popularity of Japanese language and the screening of Japanese movies
were considered as a part of the publicity work, purposed to contact and approach local
people including overseas Chinese. Together with the propaganda showing the
national strength of Japan, it helps to gain the resonance and support from the local
people. However, because French sovereignty was maintained in French Indochina,
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Japan did not have the condition to conduct propaganda work. All in all, Japan’s
propaganda work under the joint rule of Japan and France is based on “cooperation.”
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6. THE RESPONSES OF FRENCH INDOCHINA OVERSEAS
CHINESE TOWARDS JAPAN’S OVERSEAS CHINESE POLICY
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Chinese Indochina's overseas
Chinese response to the previous Chapter 5 of Japan's French Indochina policy and to
explore the role of overseas Chinese in Japanese-French relations.

The trend of overseas Chinese in Indochina
Since the intrusion of the Japanese military in French Indochina, the French
Indochina was the source of Japanese military supplies and resources. In May 1941,
the French Indochina Economic Agreement restricted the French Indochina rice to be
preferentially exported to Japan, Manchuria, China and other places where the
Japanese army station, and could not be exported to the third country (other regions).212
Also, since rice must be shipped through Mitsui

T, it means that in addition

to the unified supply of rice to Mitsui, the export of rice to the traditional overseas
markets becomes impossible and profit cannot be obtained. 213 Also, Japan asked
overseas Chinese to give up the warehouse in the port of Saigon which warehouse has
been used by overseas Chinese for storing rice. Moreover, if it was transferred to Japan,
it was equivalent to the overseas Chinese give up the rice-exporting industry and
surrendered to Japan.
While Japan was controlling the rice market in Indochina, to ensure the supply
of rice to its troops and people, in French Indochina, the overseas Chinese have also
to deal with the strict restrictions from the French Indochina authorities on the
production and output on rice. Under the Japanese-French Joint-governance system,
overseas Chinese's influence and rights on the rice trading agencies turned inferior in
French Indochina, the benefits they could obtain were also reduced. Since then, for
overseas Chinese, the problem is no longer the support for the motherland, but the
urgent need was to overcome their business difficulties. The overseas Chinese in this
new situation, facing the oppression of both the Japanese and the French Indochina
government, tried to strengthen the original organization as a response.
The primary origins of overseas Chinese were Fujian and Guangdong, which
were successively occupied by the Japanese army in 1937 and 1938, while Wang
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Jingwei’s Nanjing National Government established in mid-March and March 1940.
In June, France was defeated by Nazi Germany in Europe, and Japan implied the
intrusion of troops in the northern French Indochina in September. According to those
incidents, the enthusiasm for the anti-Japanese activities of the overseas Chinese
gradually cooled. At the end of May 1940, the Vietnam Cochinchine Overseas Chinese
Nation Salvation Committee [[<¨¼ was forced to be dissolved by
the French Indochina authorities with the association banning rules.
Against this background, the French Indochina overseas Chinese gradually
became opposed to the Chongqing regime. At that time, the "Osaka Asahi Shimbun"
reported that the local Chinese had become tired of the fundraising activities of the
Chongqing side and gradually approached the Nanjing National Government. Among
them, Tan Kah Kee ©L, who is the president of the China Relief Fund Committee
   º ¦ W G n  ¾ 0  X , went to China to inspect, “surprised by the
corruption and corruption in Chongqing”, and after that, he suddenly retired from the
front line of the anti-Japanese movement, which gave a big shock to the overseas
Chinese society. As a result, some of the French Indochina overseas Chinese began to
approach the Nanjing National Government.
After the Japanese army intrusion in French Indochina, the overseas Chinese
of Indochina, especially the overseas Chinese of Cholon, was under surveillance by
the Japanese military and were caught in a situation that had to meet Japanese demands.
Among them, Zhang Zhen-fan p2, Guan Chiheng Â·6, He Luo 9À, Zhu
Jixing and other overseas Chinese leaders of Indochina, all of whom turned to support
the Nanjing National Government and openly expressed their position and cooperated
with Japan. 214 These are the characters who are enough to influence the overseas
Chinese society of the Indochina, so the fluctuation of their opinion has also
significantly affected the entire Chinese community.
Therefore, cooperation with Japan to protect its own family has become a
reason for the dramatic changes in the attitude of overseas Chinese to Japan. There are
also a lot of overseas Chinese who use the unusual system in wartime to gain benefits
from war. The overseas Chinese rice merchants, who have mastered the rice
distribution institution in French Indochina, followed the orders of the governor of
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French Indochina, assisted Japan to concentrate the raw rice from all over Indochina,
and to transport it to the rice-polishing workshops in Cholon, and finally, to transport
the polished rice to the Japanese rice-export companies in Indochina. Overseas
Chinese businessmen engaged in trade in other commodities are also close to the
Japanese army, and have obtained special permission to become a "Purveyors &
§," opened an exclusive store for the Japanese, transferred military supplies for the
Japanese army, and operated casinos and sake houses in the name of the Japanese.215
Due to limitations of materials, the trade-related issues between the French Indochina
overseas Chinese and the Japanese military/companies were hard to understand.
On the other hand, from Kang Chuan ’s translation of Shoichi Matsuda
Q'’s work “Trend of Overseas Chinese in Vietnam: The Anti-Japanese force
is still Strong [¨U|/ —?

Èɞ—” in 1942216, which could be

seen as the source from China’s side, it stated that though the Vietnam Cochinchine
Overseas Chinese Nation Salvation Committee [[<¨¼ was forced
to be dissolved in May 1940, however, the overseas Chinese organization supporting
the Chongqing National Government continued the underground work under the
command of the Embassy of Chongqing National Government in Cholon with the
Chinese Kuomintang Branch in Saigon and Cholon.217

Japan’s overseas Chinese policy and Nanjing National Government’s overseas
Chinese policy
First of all, the Kuomintang Annam branch of Chongqing National
Government expelled the pro-Wang Jing-wei party members. After that, the branch
was reorganized, while keeping the secret connection with the Chongqing National
Government. At the same time, the branch had four mission guidelines as below:218
1. Too the collection of materials and contributions for supporting the Chiang regime
2.

To equip our reporters in various overseas Chinese news agencies, focusing on

the anti-Japanese and Chongqing side propaganda work.
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3.

Raising relief funds for Chinese refugees

4.

Guide the Boy Scouts and Youth League

Among the guidelines, the collection of contributions was the most important, to aid
China in the war.
The French Indochina authorities disbanded the Vietnam Overseas Chinese
National Salvation Association at the end of May 1940, but it turned underground to
continue their anti-Japanese activities. After Japan’s intrusion in the northern French
Indochina, although the “Chiang’s aid route" in the northern French Indochina was cut
off, the “Chiang’s aid route" in the southern French Indochina still remained.
Therefore, in July 1941, the Japanese army imposed an overseas Chinese who lived in
the southern French Indochina and threatened to live in Saigon and Cholon. In this
context, the Consul General of Saigon of the Chongqing regime worried that the
Japanese army would "enter" the local area, which would make the powerful people
of overseas Chinese begin to approach Japan. Therefore, the highest instructor of the
anti-Japanese activities centered on Cholon, Yin Fengzao ±Æ, the Chinese consul
in the Chongqing side of Saigon, to threaten the overseas Chinese who were suspicious
to be cooperate with Japan strictly by calling them to the Embassy, and attempted to
promote the Chinese nationalism during his regular inspection, sent the warning to the
local powerful overseas Chinese as a countermeasure.219 "The final victory against
Japan's war is close, regardless of the reputation of the past to being close to Japan is
foolish that you will be regretted in the future, I warned you in the name of the
nation."220 In the translation of Kang, it also recorded that Yin had expelled some
overseas Chinese “traitors” from the French Indochina, with confiscated the expelled
overseas Chinese wealth as the capital of anti-Japanese movement of Kuomintang
there.221 However, in that translation, it also mentioned that after Japanese “entered”
French Indochina, the anti-Japanese movement of French Indochina overseas Chinese
had gradually decline owing to the suppression of the French Indochina
government.222
Later, on September 25, 1941, Yin Fengzao escaped from Saigon with He
Guosui (9¡), the Chief Minister of the Kuomintang branch in Saigon and Cholon.
On the surface, they escaped to Hong Kong. However, they "sneaked into the southern
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part of the French Indochina, approached with British and American forces, and guide
the anti-Japanese work." They continued to impose sanctions on overseas Chinese who
cooperated with the Japanese side, disseminated information on "the Japanese troops
stationed in the Indochina will seize overseas Chinese property," and continue to warn
the overseas Chinese from approaching Japan by warning letters. 223 However,
according to Hong GensongdtQ’s Waijiaoguan Linanji!*IɰÃx in 1981,
Yin was under three years and nine months’ house arrest of the French from December
1941. Although it was hard to recover the reality of the underground anti-Japanese
movements guided by the Kuomintang, still, the possibility existed.
However, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, including the overseas Chinese
in French Indochina, began to shake and split into the "counter-war faction" and "peace
faction" after the Nanjing National Government was established.224 After the New
Fourth Army incident on January 4, 1941, overseas Chinese began to question the
Chongqing regime’s policy in the Sino-Japanese War. In March 1941, Tan Kah Kee,
an influential figure among the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, invited Overseas
Chinese in Southeast Asia to launch the second Nanyang General Conference in
Singapore. Although 87 groups and 164 delegates participated, the overseas Chinese
in Thailand and French Indochina, however, did not respond to Tan Kah Kee’s
invitation letter.225 It can be seen as a change in the political attitude of the overseas
Chinese in the two places after the Japanese army intrusion in Thailand and French
Indochina.
Historical sources from the Japanese side at the time showed the rapid
transition of the political attitude of the overseas Chinese in Indochina in the first half
of 1941. On March 30, 1941, about 100 overseas Chinese representatives from Hanoi
and Haiphong attended the memorial service of Zeng Zhongming, the secretary of
Wang Jingwei who was shot in Hanoi on March 21, 1939. At the time, there were
Overseas Chinese protested on Japan's investigation in the Chinese residence, for
banning the secret supplies to Chiang Kai-shek regime; by April 16, 1941, 16 overseas
Chinese representatives from the northern French Indochina hosted the representatives
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of the Japanese Association and held a round-table conference in Hanoi. Then, on the
day of the outbreak of the Pacific War, December 8, 1941, eight representatives from
Cholon overseas Chinese, "visited the Embassy (of Japan), stated to the Minister
Uchiyama{ that they would give up the former hostile attitude and cooperate with
Japan in an all-around way." On next day, Cholon Overseas Chinese "from the
Congregation President to the leaders swearing to assist Japan in the Branch of
Japanese Embassy." Also, the majority of overseas Chinese living in the Indochina
were who have French nationality (Qiaosheng), did not care about the Chongqing
National Government nor Chinese politics. Instead, they "purchase plenty of Japanese
goods before their overseas Chinese competitors;" "Japan is a convenient existence,"
which were from the perspective of economic competition.
After the Pacific War began in December 1941, entire Southeast Asia was
quickly occupied by the Japanese troops. It was also one of the reasons explains many
French Indochina overseas Chinese turned to declare their pro-Japanese attitude
publicly.226 In other aspects, the corruption of the Chongqing National Government,
with its cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party, have disappointed/
dissatisfied the overseas Chinese increasingly, which was one of the main reason
overseas Chinese changed from anti-Japanese to pro-Japanese and cooperate with the
Nanjing National Government of Wang Jingwei. On December 21, 1941, the overseas
Chinese in Indochina in Saigon and Cholon declared the attitude of "Chongqing
obliteration, Nanjing support" and held the unveil ceremony of "the Flag of Peace and
Saving the Nation" in Cholon. Also, Sun Yat-sen's statues and photos with Wang
Jingwei's photos are all increasing rapidly in political propaganda. In 1942, at a SinoJapanese round-table conference held at the Cholon, the Cholon Overseas Chinese
claimed to refuse to be the partner of the Chongqing regime. In contrast, they showed
the willingness to cooperate with the Japanese and Wang to found a new government
in China.
A concrete example of the change in the attitude of the French Indochina
overseas Chinese can be seen in the example of Zhang Zhen-fan p2. Born 1882
in French Indochina, Zhang was an influential figure among the overseas Chinese in
Cholon. In the administrative position, Zhang Zhen-fan is the President of the Hokkien
Congregation, and he was also the President of the Union of Seven Congregations 
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MN. At the same time, from 1938 to 1939, he served as the Chairman of the
Chinese General Association of Commerce in Vietnam, President of the Association
of Rice Transaction Departments of that Association, and President of the Association
of Overseas Chinese Rice Merchants, who held massive influence in the local ricepaddy distribution organization. After anti-Japanese movements outbreak in Mainland
China in 1928, due to the Shandong Incident, Zhang donated 500,000 yuan to support
Chiang Kai-shek. At the time, Zhang got praised by Chiang. After the start of War in
China, Zhang was the president of the Cochin-china General Association of Overseas
Chinese for National Salvation that established on August 1, 1937. Moreover, from
1938 to 1939, Zhang was also served as a member of the Kuomintang Conference of
Political Consultants $}`Ç for the Chongqing government.227 At the time, he
was considered as the influential overseas Chinese figure in French Indochina who
also controlled the rice industry there.
However, in May 1941, before the arrival of Japanese troops, Zhang left French
Indochina to Hong Kong, along with Zhu Jixing and Liu Zeng ²³, who were the
Teochew Congregation President and Canton Congregation Head respectively.228 It
might because they want to show that they will not to cooperate with Japan. However,
Liu was soon traveled to Shanghai and Tianjin were under the control of the Nanjing
National Government, which was apparently not escaping Japan’s influence. Zhu and
Zhang, who were in Guangzhou at the time, received the letter from Zhang Yongfu,
the Envoy of the Nanjing Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, promising to protect their
families’ safety and property, finally convinced them to return to French Indochina.229
After that, three of them declared that they “realized the transition of the situation,”
showed their will to cooperate with Japan.230
Zhang Zhen-fan returned as the chairman of the Union of Seven Congregations
MN and served as the chief secretary of the Association of Paddy Merchants in
Cochin-china. After that, Zhang established the Association of Overseas Chinese in
Cochin-china for supporting the Nanjing National Government and served as the
chairman.
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Moreover, other overseas Chinese leaders such as He Luo, Ong Tich, Ma Vinh,
had also joined the Association.231
In 1942, Zhang Zhen-fan publicly sent a telegram to the Chongqing National
government with He Luo, stated that
“We are now belatedly cooperating with the Japanese army to establish a
Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. We hope to put an end to the foolish
decisions made by the Japanese false convictions and to bring China out of the
frying pan.”232
On August 18, 1942 issue of the “Taiwan Daily News” published a statement
by Zhang Zhen-fan as follows:
“My resolution to side with Wang’s government was made early, but
due to the difficulties, I had to spend some time in Macau to observe
developments. As the Japanese army entered Indochina without being
distributed by any anti-Japanese Overseas Chinese, the French authorities
themselves changed their attitude towards the Chinese. I used to be a Political
Consultant but in reality, I never participated in the political affairs of
Chongqing, and my reputation was merely ceremonial. In December last year,
when the Greater East Asia war started, I learned that the Japanese had done
many good things in Vietnam, and so I knew that the time was ripe. I expressed
my support through telegram on behalf of 500,000 Overseas Chinese in
Vietnam. About the current Nationalist government, due to the lack of
information, I am unable to donate or send my money, but I hope to get in
contact with and support it as soon as possible. I am lucky to own three rice
mills and also engage in commercial activities. I hope that maritime routes are
recovered as soon as possible so that trade with Japan and the new China can
be commenced.
What we currently yearn for the most is that the French government
and French authorities in Indochina will soon recognize the [Wang]
government. We have supported the government for a long time, but because
the French authorities refuse to recognize it, there is hardly any chance for us
to launch a formidable movement.
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However, in response to the recent declaration, they seemed to show
no opposition and even hinted some compromise, I have not rallied the Chinese
in Vietnam, but I believe that the day when they befriend the Japanese and
resolutely stand up for President Wang’s government is not so far off.”233
From Zhang’s statement, he required the French Indochina government to
recognize the Nanjing National Government.234 Also, since Zhang Zhen-fan, the most
influential overseas Chinese in French Indochina economically and politically,
publicity showed his support to the Nanjing National Government, it was shocked to
the overseas Chinese society there, at the same time, beneficial for Japan of getting
overseas Chinese support.
Started in 1943, many of the pro-Japanese organization started to organize in
French Indochina. It was unclear about the details of each organization, However, the
report of the police of Cochin-china, had recorded that on January 17, 1943, the
Association of War-supporting Overseas Chinese in Cochin-china was established in
a cinema, by 2000 overseas Chinese there, for providing material and spiritual support
to the Greater East Asia War.235 Zhang Zhen-fan was also served as the president of
this association. Also, the above association was officially protected by the Japanese
Embassy and the Nanjing Kuomingtang office in Cochin-china.236

The dramatic changes of French Indochina overseas Chinese attitude towards
Japan could be explained as follows:
 After Japan occupied Guangdong and Fujian, where most of the overseas Chinese
in French Indochina from or originate, they worried about their ancestors’ tombs
would be ruined by the Japanese. After the Japanese troops ordered to protect the
tombs, overseas Chinese hostility towards Japan slightly cool down.
 In the overseas Chinese society at the time, there were Minh Huong and Kieu Sinh
who had been localized. To Minh Huong and Kieu Sinh, they were not concerned
about what happens in China. Instead, they concern about gaining profit and
protecting their properties by obeying the regulations of the French Indochina
government.
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The intensified War had led to the hardship of overseas Chinese livelihoods. For their
survival, also to gain the profit, overseas Chinese, especially the Kieu Sinh, turned to
collaborators of Japan under Japan’s suppression and military threat. Zhang Zhen-fan
was one of the significant examples.

Chapter 6 Summary
This chapter examines that after the Japanese troop's intrusion in the northern
French Indochina, Japan took the French Indochina regime as the intermediary, tried
to ban the anti-Japanese activities of overseas Chinese, and removed the anti-Japanese
attitude of overseas Chinese. After the Japanese troop's intrusion in the southern
French Indochina in July 1941, Japan directly launched its overseas Chinese work and
monitored and banned overseas Chinese. Generally speaking, the French Indochina
government implemented the overseas Chinese work under the Japanese navy and
ambassador's government, along with the policy of the overseas Chinese policy
decided by the Japanese government, and on the agreement of the three. Therefore, the
implementation process of overseas Chinese work, such as the arrest of anti-Japanese
overseas Chinese, Japan to show respect for the sovereignty of France in Indochina,
often also beforehand. However, on the other hand, the French Indochina authorities
are also criticizing Japan’s actions against France’s sovereignty in French Indochina.
This means that there are various disagreements and confrontations between Japan and
the French Indochina regime.
However, the relationship between Japan and French Indochina at that time
was quite complicated. Japan did not exercise military governance in the French
Indochina. Instead, it established a joint-dominance system with France authorities in
Indochina by preserving the existing French Indochina regime. This relationship also
reflects the nature of the Japan-French Indochina relation.
The French Indochina authorities severely suppressed the overseas Chinese to
prevent their illegal activities and political activities, and also arrested the overseas
Chinese whom engaged in anti-Japanese activities, responding to the request of Japan.
Therefore, for their survival along with their family, overseas Chinese in French
Indochina has two main options. One is to show pro-Japanese attitude, to exchange for
possible Japanese protection. The another is supporting the Nanjing National
Government (under Japan indirectly). The French Indochina overseas Chinese
expressed their support for the Nanjing National Government on the political front and
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approached Japan for economic gain. As mentioned above, Japan’s overseas Chinese
policy in French Indochina differs from other Southeast Asian regions such as Malaya,
Indonesia, Philippines, which was relatively mild and stable.
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CONCLUSION
In the first chapter, we explored the overview of overseas Chinese society in
French Indochina before Japan’s invasion. We learned the role of overseas Chinese in
economy and politics in French Indochina and the existing policies they have back
then.
Around 1940, The population of overseas Chinese accounts for only 2% of the
total population of French Indochina. Even with their insignificant number, they
played a huge role in the economy of French Indochina. They acted as mediator
between French and the locals, and gained immense profits from rice industry, rice
distribution agencies, trade organizations and other local industries. The overseas
Chinese in French Indochina monopolize the rice distribution not only the cities of
Saigon and Cholon, but also the other villages and towns in the countryside
In need for workforce to develop the land, the government of the French
Indochina welcomed overseas Chinese, and this has been the case in other European
colonies in Southeast Asia. However, with the increasing population of the overseas
Chinese, along with the expansion of its economic power, the colonial government
gradually saw them as a threat. French Indochina government imposed restrictions on
the activities of overseas Chinese, and asked overseas Chinese to group and organize
themselves. In Vietnam, Chinese people are organized in “congregation”, groups
formed according to hometown. Each congregation has an appointed overseas Chinese
chief who will monitor the entry and exit of overseas Chinese. The chiefs also take
charge of collecting taxes (poll, business, land etc.). At this time, congregation is one
of the essential factors for the overseas Chinese to survive.

The second chapter discusses the movements of the overseas Chinese of the
French Indochina when the Sino-Japanese War started and before the Japanese
military invasion in northern French Indochina. From the end of the 19th century to
Japan’s invasion, overseas Chinese are in constant conflict with Japanese companies
in terms of economic and political aspects.
The overseas Chinese in French Indochina who are geographically adjacent to
mainland China, have widespread anti-Japanese movements in French Indochina.
These actions are influenced by the movements happening in China. Most of the
overseas Chinese originated from Guangdong and Fujian who are active in this antiJapanese movements were located in the southern French Indochina (Saigon). Since
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the 1928 Jinan Incident, the overseas Chinese in French Indochina took the Vietnam
Overseas Chinese Federation of Trade Unions [¨¼ to spearhead the antiJapanese movements. These focused putting economic restrictions, such as boycotting
Japanese goods and cutting off financial relationships with Japanese companies.
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Kuomintang government
moved to Chongqing and received assistance from countries such as Britain and the
United States. The British and American supplies were delivered via several routes
(“Chiang's Aid Route") in Southeast Asia, and French Indochina is one of the major
routes (Northern French Indochina: land route; Southern French Indochina: sea route).
The supplies to Chongqing National Government included not only military supplies
from the United Kingdom and the United States but also monetary donations from
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. The Sino-Japanese war lasted longer than
expected because of the support of overseas Chinese in French Indochina. After Japan
captured the Guangdong and Fujian around 1938, the attitude of the overseas Chinese
in French Indochina changed and became more supportive of Japan.
The third chapter discusses the contents of Japan's policies on overseas
Chinese that were established in 1943 between the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific
War. With the long-lasting Sino-Japanese war, Japan established the the policy of
building a co-prosperous circle in Greater East Asia (Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere) that enabled them to quickly access resources in Southeast Asia. This policy
was meant to counter the economic sanctions and embargoes initiated by the Allies.
Under this circumstance, the economic power held by overseas Chinese is of great
appeal and importance to Japan. Initially, Japan viewed that overseas Chinese would
quickly become a possible support in introducing Japanese products in the Southeast
Asian market. However, the response of overseas Chinese was different and they
prevented Japanese economic activities in the region. For Japan’s economic expansion
in the region, it is essential for them to severe the relationship between overseas
Chinese and mainland China. This will stop not only the contribution of overseas
Chinese to Chongqing National Government, but also the boycott of Japanese goods
in the region.
In the fourth chapter, the focus of the analysis was on the position of Japan's
policy on overseas Chinese in French Indochina in relation to Japan's general policy
on overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. The headquarters of the Indo china Exploratory
Army of Japan established the Overseas Chinese policy in French Indochina 8-
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¨:s . This policy is the main source of the inferences made in Chapter 4.
With the dramatic changes in the European battlefield and deterioration of
Japan-US relations, it was getting more and more difficult for Japan to get supplies
from abroad. The possibility of war between Japan and Britain-America, therefore,
became more evident. To achieve self-sufficiency in resources, Japan have to consider
the possibility of expanding to Southeast Asia. In late 1939, the Japanese government
established a policy and formed the “empire economic self-sufficient circle ^¤º
4“ in Southeast Asia. The policy hoped to get rid of their economic dependence
to Britain and the United States.237
At the time, from the economic point of view, Japan viewed Dutch East Indies
and British Malaya as valuable sources of oil and rubber. The role of French Indochina
back then is a bridgehead to get access to these colonies. Controlling French Indochina
also is same as cutting off one of the most important route (“Chiang's Aid Route 
Ǹ26(”) at the time. Also, rice from French Indochina plays an essential role in
ensuring the food supply in Japan to the various Japanese garrisons in Japan's occupied
regions.
Chapter five analyzed and discussed the reality of Japan's overseas Chinese
policy in French Indochina based on three directions, which are economics, politics,
and propaganda.
On the economic side, the plot of Japan-centered economic intervention in the
various economic fields has become very difficult. This can be attributed to the
continued presence of the French Indochina regime and the economic role they play.
As a result of the agreement, Japan could only use the French Indochina regime as an
intermediary to regulate the local rice distribution agencies and trading organizations.
Because of the economic difficulties under Japan’s control, the overseas Chinese in
French Indochina have to cooperate with Japan to ensure their survival, protection and
the even further pursuit of interests.

Regarding politics, Japan utilized the existing French Indochina regime to
arrest the anti-Japanese overseas Chinese, and at the same time supporting its puppet,
the Nanjing Nationalist Government. These actions try to create their image from the
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overseas Chinese, making them pro-Japan.
In the publicity work, various propaganda efforts were carried out to fight the
anti-Japanese propaganda against the Kuomintang government, United States, and
Great Britain, and to obtain overseas Chinese support. These were carried out through
the popularization of Japanese language and Japanese film shooting.

Chapter 6 examines how French Indochina overseas Chinese responded to
Japan’s overseas Chinese policy. The development of war had affected the attitude of
overseas Chinese leader toward Japan, and this can be seen from Zhang Zhen-fan’s
personal story. Born in French Indochina, Zhang Zhen-fan is an authoritative figure
among the overseas Chinese of Cholon. Started as the head of the Fujian Congregation
in Cholon, Zhang became the president of the Vietnam Chinese Chamber of
Commerce in around 1938-39. In the 1920s when Japan-China relations were quite
tense, Zhang Zhen-fan organized the fundraising for supporting his motherland China.
After the Sino-Japanese War began, Zhang became the president of the "Vietnam
Overseas Chinese National Salvation Association [<¨¼." In around
1938-1939, Zhang served as a member of the Guomindang Conference of Political
Consultants $}`Ç for the Chongqing government. As the most influential
overseas Chinese figure in French Indochina, Zhang, however, escaped from there
with other influential overseas Chinese leaders before Japan’s arrival in Southern
French Indochina. However, soon, after the establishment of the New Nanjing
National Government, Zhang returned and declared his support to the Nanjing Regime.
It was an example of how overseas Chinese in French Indochina turned to cooperate
with Japan owing to the pressure of survival and economic benefits.
In the case of Zhang, it could be inferred that the attitude of overseas Chinese
to mainland China may reflect to the political environment of Indochina. Before
Japanese troops intrusion, the French Indochina government was somehow a
bystander of overseas Chinese’s anti-Japanese movements. French Indochina had not
taken action on the following: boycott movement, fundraising, violent “punishment”
of the “collaborators/ traitors,” and the aid to the Chiang government. However, with
Japan’s invasion, French Indochina government needed to cooperate with Japan. To
reduce the anti-Japanese movement through the colonial government, a “carrot and
stick” policy was implemented. They try to get overseas Chinese support by giving
them economic rewards and punishing actions against Japan. To survive, a
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considerable number of overseas Chinese leaders abandoned their ideals and
cooperated with Japan and the Nanjing National Government. Overseas Chinese who
supported Japan were considered as “traitors,” and were “punished (executed)” by the
underground Chinese nationalist. Many of the historical records and materials were
destroyed by the overseas Chinese who supported Japan. However, due to the
limitation of materials, it was hard to discuss this in detail.
After the arrival of the Japanese military in 1940-41, the French Indochina was
an essential base for the Japanese army to enter and leave the entire Southeast Asia
region. With Japan’s food shortages, French Indochina was also a stable supply base
of rice. The Japanese military used the local government of French Indochina as an
agency to ban the anti-Japanese activities of overseas Chinese in the region. At the
same time, they are trying to get the cooperation of overseas Chinese.
With the establishment of the Japanese-French Common Domination System,
overseas Chinese in French Indochina gradually changed their hostility towards Japan.
They have shown their willingness to cooperate with Japan and Nanjing National
Government. Majority of anti-Japanese activities together with the institutions of the
Chongqing National Government turned underground after the Japanese military
stationed in the French Indochina.
Owing to the French-Japanese Joint Economic Agreement, the rice in French
Indochina could only export to Japan and the other area occupied by the Japanese
Army. For survival, overseas Chinese in French Indochina who controlled the local
rice trading organizations have no choice but to accept the restriction set by Japan. In
1940, pro-Japan Nanjing Nationalist Government was established. The existence of
two “Nationalist Government” in China provided the French Indochina overseas
Chinese an alternative. At the end of 1941, when the Japanese military occupied other
Southeast Asian regions and Hong Kong, it was difficult for those against Japan to
retaliate and survive. The pro-Japanese attitude of the overseas Chinese in French
Indochina, therefore, increased significantly. However, the only few overseas Chinese
in French Indochina expressed their direct support to Japan. Most of the them showed
their approval with Japan by supporting the pro-Japanese Nanjing Nationalist
Government. With this action, they can avoid not only direct pressure from Japan, but
also sanctions imposed by the Chongqing Nationalist government on "traitors."
Overseas Chinese in Singapore, Malaya, and Indonesia who underwent strict
Military Governance of Japan showed more hostility than those in French Indochina.

98

Overseas Chinese associations in those regions have stronger connection in local antiJapanese Movements with more violent approaches (such as guerilla warfare and
massacre on overseas Chinese). Since the French Indochinese Government was
preserved, Japanese Army could not have direct military measures and would usually
requests the assistance from the French Indochinese government to take over the antiJapanese Movements. The differing approaches could explain the opposite attitudes
held between overseas Chinese in French-Indochina and those in other regions
(specially region A).
Moreover, the overseas Chinese in French Indochina showed pro-Japan
attitude due to the following reasons. Firstly, overseas Chinese especially the
influential leaders who mastered the local rice economy wanted to maintain their
economic privileges under the new economic system established by Japan. Therefore,
they try to satisfy the requirements of Japan. Secondly, the overseas Chinese in French
Indochina have two options to express their support to Japan. They can choose to
support the Nanjing government or directly cooperate with Japan. Thirdly, the
existence of the French-Indochinese regime, the colonial institutions were preserved.
Opportunities to develop anti-Japanese guerrillas such as the Malaya Anti-Japanese
People's Army were close to none until the French-Japanese Joint Governance system
collapsed. Therefore, having a pro-Japanese attitude is a best survival strategy they
can have at the time.
It should be noted that the relation of French Indochina regime and Japanese
government is complicated and have limited their actions toward their agenda. In the
course of the development of overseas Chinese work, Japan had to seek the consent
and assistance of French Indochina regime in its policy toward the overseas Chinese
there. However, French Indochinese authorities considered Japan’s actions as
demeaning to France’s sovereignty. Japan’s relations with the French-Indochinese
regime are both discordant and antagonistic.
The overseas Chinese of French Indochina have adopted a "comply in
appearance but oppose in heart" approach. To ensure their survival and protect their
economic interests, they have to support the Nanjing National Government and show
their willingness to cooperate with Japan. As a result, pro-Japanese groups made of
overseas Chinese were organized in French Indochina region. French Indochina was
the only place where Japan had a systematic implementation of overseas Chinese work.
To induce and utilize their cooperation, Nanjing National Government was used to
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initiate overseas Chinese policies in Southeast Asia. Japan’s vision is to build an East
Asian co-prosperity circle through the cooperation of overseas Chinese, but what’s
achieved was the preservation of the French Indochinese regime. This action was
instrumental to maintain the old colonial order and the vested interests of overseas
Chinese under the joint domination of Japan and France.
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